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Abstract
Maintaining usable security in application domains such as healthcare or power systems
requires an ongoing conversation among stakeholders such as end-users, administrators,
developers, and policy makers. Each party has power to influence the design and imple-
mentation of the application and its security posture, and effective communication among
stakeholders is one key to achieving influence and adapting an application to meet evolving
needs.
In this thesis, we develop a system that combines keyboard/video/mouse (KVM) capture
with automatic text redaction to produce precise technical content that can enrich stake-
holder communications, improve end-user influence on system evolution, and help reveal
the definition of “usable security.” Text-redacted screen captures reduce sensitivity of cap-
tured material and thus can facilitate timely data sharing among stakeholders.
KVM-based capture makes our system both application and operating-system indepen-
dent because it eliminates software-interface dependencies on capture targets. Thus, our
work can be used to instrument closed or certified systems where capture software cannot
be installed or documentation and support lack. It can instrument widely-varying platforms
that lack standards-compliance and interoperability or redact special document formats
while displayed onscreen.
We present three techniques for redacting text from screenshots and two redaction ap-
plications. One application can capture, text redact, and edit screen video and the other
can text redact and edit static screenshots. We also present empirical measurements of
ii
redaction effectiveness and processing latency to demonstrate system performance.
When applied to our principal dataset, redaction removes text with over 93% accuracy
and simultaneously preserves more than 76% of image pixels on average. Thus by default,
it retains more visual context than a technique such as blindly redacting entire screenshots.
Finally, our system redacts each screenshot in .1 to 21 seconds depending on which tech-
nique it applies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Application stakeholders seek to implement “usable security” in their systems—security
that protects system access and data and promotes intended system use. While doing so,
each stakeholder can ask herself, “does a system facilitate tasks it is meant to support and
thwart or inhibit ‘bad things’ from happening?” The answer to this question depends on
her role: is she an end-user, developer, system administrator, policy maker, or someone
else? Each party has a perspective in the system, and therefore, to a achieve a usable secure
system, application security requires an ongoing conversation among many stakeholders.
Standard engineering tenets suggest that to understand and tune a system, we should
measure it. Therefore, an effective conversation about usable security should include data
that describes system nuances, behaviors, and system effects on stakeholders. With contin-
ual data collection and ongoing conversations, stakeholders can repeatedly tune the system
in facets such as source code, configurations, and policy to maintain a working notion of
“usable security.” Thus, the conversation of “usable security” is in part, a data-driven com-
munication.
To facilitate this data-driven conversation, we develop instrumentation that captures
text-redacted keyboard/video/mouse (KVM) traces—the point where humanspace and cy-
berspace [46] intersect. Because “usable security” includes components from each space,
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this intersection serves as a sensible target to measure. Additionally, by capturing data at the
KVM interface and text-redacting images, we eliminate software interface dependencies
and allow our system to remain both operating-system and application independent. This
design choice may be important when instrumented systems lack standards-compliance
and interoperability, are regulated and thus cannot readily accept capture software, contain
many screen and document formats of interest, or lack documentation and support.
To promote repeated collections, the system should redact text effectively and with rea-
sonable performance. Redaction helps ensure the privacy of captured data and can facilitate
timely data sharing among application stakeholders, and reasonable performance reduces
the capture system’s impact on end-user workflows. Therefore, we measure redaction ef-
fectiveness and processing latency.
Collecting data
The current process of obtaining human-computer interface (HCI) data is slow, people-
intensive, ad hoc, and repetitive; few systematic, automated, institutionalized mechanisms
exist. Collection steps include paperwork, institutional review board (IRB) approval, re-
search manager sign-offs, and interactions with information technology staff who maintain
the technical systems of interest. We intend our system to automate and simplify this pro-
cess and hence lower the barrier to data capture, analysis, and application tuning.
Sharing data
End-users experience application problems such as missing functionality, fouled permis-
sions, crashes, and impediments to workflow. With instrumentation, end-users could cap-
ture these issues securely, share them with appropriate application stakeholders, and have
the issues redressed.
2
Technology
With computer vision algorithms to implement redaction, modern-day computing power,
and large volumes of rich data, researchers can study usable security empirically; end-
users can participate empirically in system configuration and development processes; and
organizational stakeholders can begin to understand their risks empirically. Our system can
facilitate these activities.
1.1 Scope and Impact
This thesis positions well within the focus of the security research and national security
communities. Each group has grown to realize the important role of usability and empirical
analysis in maintaining secure systems. Events such as Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS) and Computer Human Interaction (CHI) demonstrate this point as they
have grown in size and importance.
In a recent interview, Dickie George, the Information Assurance Technical Director of
the National Security Agency (NSA) stated that “fighting today’s cyber cold war depends
on [. . . ] the adoption of security that is transparent to the end user” [44]. Our proposed
work allows us to collect data near the end user and begin to analyze the definition of
“usable security” empirically.
Additionally, Dr. Doug Maughan, Branch Chief in Homeland Security Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency within the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department
of Homeland Security, outlined a research roadmap that defines the U.S. cybersecurity
R&D agenda [63]. Enterprise-level security metrics, privacy-aware security, and usable se-
curity comprise 3 of the 11 research areas listed on the roadmap. Our proposed work makes
direct headway into these areas by securing and systematizing data collection in order to
empirically understand usable security.
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1.2 Vision
In our long-term vision, the fruit of this work can enable empirical feedback paths between
application stakeholders. Developers, administrators, end-users, organizations that produce
or deploy a particular system, and legislators or governance bodies that create rules to
govern systems all represent different types of stakeholders. With established feedback
paths, such stakeholders can begin to understand empirically the day-to-day, system-effects
of their decisions.
A simple capture system can also provide direct value to end-users by endowing them
with a larger, empirical role in the software maintenance cycle. They can capture, annotate,
and share problems, configurations, ideas, bugs, and other captured scenarios with stake-
holders. They can inform existing ad hoc stakeholder interactions such as online support
forums and help-desk interactions with rich, contextual data. Additionally, end-users can
use traces as visual web search keys during their own investigations.
Playing a larger role in the software maintenance cycle can motivate end-users to share
their findings continually: if end-users believe and experience that their contributions make
a positive difference to their workflow, end-users may be motivated to contribute further.
Consequently, organizations may improve empirical insight into their information security
systems and associated risk calculations. When organizations lack the expertise to analyze
traces in-house, they could hire third parties to do so.
Large volumes of captured KVM data can form a new computational science concerned
with usable security, application usability, debugging, and other topics that benefit from
KVM evidence. The birth of such a field is akin to how computational social science be-
comes possible when large volumes of data from websites such as Twitter or Facebook
enable study of social-interactions at macro scales. Through secured traces and new algo-
rithms that mine large capture collections, stakeholder will have a simple means at their
disposal to inform a deeper and empirical understanding of their systems.
Finally, simple KVM instrumentation could initiate the understanding of usable secu-
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rity in settings such as medicine where access to software APIs may be limited. In such
domains, machines may be certified or lack standards compliance and interoperability and
thus not viable targets for instrumentation that requires software API access. Altogether,
the secure capture system we propose can take us one step closer to the vision we describe.
1.3 Putting it All Together
Consider the following concrete example of how screen capture for sensitive systems could
help improve overall system security. Note in the following discussion how our system
could systematize data collection and protection to forgo instance-based IRB approvals
and augment developer communications with “HIPAA-safe”1, precise, empirical findings.
A large hospital relies on an EHR system to facilitate healthcare delivery, and computer
workstations exist throughout the hospital campus to promote convenient EHR access by
clinicians. These end-users access hundreds of different screens and forms provided by
the system and sometimes deal with slight changes in screen content when the hospital
upgrades the EHR software every 6 months.
To interact with the system, end-users enter their login username and password at any
workstation, and an administrative policy requires them to log off each time they walk away
from their logged-in system. While clinicians lack positive control over their session, any
person could walk up, view, and manipulate the system using clinician credentials. Because
clinicians become busy and frequently revisit a recently logged-in workstation, and because
the system loses desktop context on logout, clinicians frequently remain logged in after they
walk away.
A security researcher working together with a policy administrator of the hospital wish
to study clinician habits related to this policy violation and understand how current au-
1We call the text-redacted document “HIPAA-safe”. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) declares that only authorized observers can view personally identifiable information such as
patient name and social security number found in medical documents [62]. Redacting text from screenshots
of such documents before sharing the images can implement such required protections.
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thentication technology does not properly align with clinician workflow. The goal is to
understand clinician workflow empirically and update the EHR authentication system to
reflect findings such that a secure system results naturally from clinician workflow.
The researcher conducts personnel interviews and wishes to gather system authentication
logs to study data patterns and correlate them with interview findings. Before obtaining
data logs from a busy information technology (IT) administrator, she composes an plan
to protect and use the log data. The plan must be approved by hospital authorities and a
committee of people (an IRB) who certify that proper data protections will be implemented.
In a non-technical, free-form process, the researcher answers questions on approximately
ten different documents and drafts a proposal to gather, protect, and use authentication logs.
The researcher has written proposals in the past and therefore has experience crafting one to
avoid major rewrites during the approval process. Additionally, she has sufficient expertise
to understand how authentication logs must be protected.
After completing the proposal, the researcher submits the request for approval. The en-
tire approval process takes a minimum of one month, many document revisions, and inter-
actions with individuals across many domains of expertise and a myriad of work schedules.
After receiving approval, the researcher collects and analyzes data and shares findings
with EHR developers. Before sharing however, she submits an addendum to the proposal
that outlines the developer exchange—the researcher forgot to include this step in her initial
paperwork. After receiving approval in approximately two weeks, the researcher interacts
with developers who implement an application update to address empirical findings. Fi-
nally, hospital IT administrators deploy the update.
This sample scenario demonstrates deficiencies in the current process of tuning an end-
user application to improve overall system security. The process is manual, free-form, and
time-consuming. A technical capture and redaction process could systematize data collec-
tion and protection, simplify the process of understanding system problems empirically,
and facilitate rich communications with developers. With a simplified and systematized
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process, many other studies could be carried out quickly and efficiently to tune EHR sys-
tems and improve their overall usability and security. Finally, this concept can applied
generally to other application domains.
1.4 Contributions
In this work, we contribute a system that combines KVM capture with text redaction
to produce precise technical content that can enrich communications among application
stakeholders. The system automatically redacts text from screenshots to reduce sensitiv-
ity of captured material and captures at the KVM interface to eliminate software interface
dependencies. Consequently, our system remains both operating-system and application
independent.
1.5 Roadmap
In the remainder of this document we discuss the system in further detail. Chapter 2 de-
scribes related work on the topics of screen capture, text segmentation, user studies, dei-
dentifying data, anonymity, and document analysis. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the
system including its architecture, design goals, functionality, and implementation. Chap-
ter 4 provides an overview of screenshot capture and the virtual-network computing (VNC)
method we implemented in this work. Chapter 5 discusses the three methods this work
relies on to redact text from screenshots. Chapter 6 describes two tools; one used to cap-
ture, text-redact, and edit screenshot video, and a second used to text-redact and edit static
screenshots. Chapter 7 presents empirical measurements of redaction quality and latency,
and Chapter 8 discusses the meaning of empirical findings. Chapter 9 describes avenues
for future work, and Chapter 10 concludes the main body of this dissertation.
Four self-contained appendices follow Chapter 10. Appendix A describes supporting
libraries used to implement this work, Appendix B discusses screenshot datasets that un-
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derlie analysis, Appendix C presents analysis tools implemented to gather empirical mea-
surements and manipulate screenshots, and Appendix D provides contact information for
the author and advisor. We recommend skimming appendices A–C first to provide relevant
background for various chapters.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Our work combines existing technologies of screen capture and computer vision with a
goal of improving the quality of communications among application stakeholders and ulti-
mately, improving our understanding of “usable security.” Many research and commercial
products implement pieces of our work in isolation and for different purposes.
Section 2.1 discusses screen capture, Section 2.2 segmenting text, Section 2.3 user stud-
ies, Section 2.4 deidentifying data, Section 2.5 anonymity, and Section 2.6 overviews the
topic of document analysis and closes the chapter.
2.1 Screen Capture
The MIT Sikuli research project combines computer vision and programming to enable
users to create machine-independent, visually-programmed and actuated programs [68].
To write a program, users select graphical user interface (GUI) objects such as buttons,
sliders, and checkboxes they wish to activate when the program is executed. Within their
running program, computer vision finds the specified objects and the program actuates
them. User-interface developers can use Sikuli to script GUI test suites [18].
A commercial product call eggPlant also allows developers to test GUIs with machine-
independent, automation scripts [53].
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Many screen capture applications such as Snipping Tool [43], Snapz Pro X [8], and
xwd [25] exist. Some programs capture still screenshots, others capture both stills and
video, and some allow end-users to annotate captures.
Our system captures data and modifies it with text redaction—we use screen captures for
a different purpose than these works. Chapter 9 outlines future work that would give our
system the ability to visually program as in Sikuli and annotate screenshots with custom
user notes.
2.2 Segmenting Text
Many commercial and free-software tools such as Gimp [58], Photoshop [7], Aperture [9],
Final Cut Studio [11], Pixelmator [47], and Imagemagick [21] allow one to paint, create,
touch up, and modify still images and/or video. Many of these applications implement
complex computer vision algorithms to allow users to isolate, select, and transform regions
of an image. These applications could be used to manually redact text from a screenshot.
In Chapter 5 we describe how our work builds on existing text segmentation research [34]
to redact text automatically from screenshots.
Google Goggles can extract and recognize text from natural scenery for purposes such
as language translation among many others [32]. The scope of our system is limited to
computer screenshots. However, screenshots taken with a camera may include angles and
lighting similar to the natural scenery submitted to Google Goggles.
2.3 User Studies
In another work, Google highlights their in-house human-computer interaction (HCI) cap-
ture system called UseTube [39]. UseTube supports employees who wish to perform user
studies of any network-connected computer; it simplifies the act of performing, archiving,
and accessing user studies. Captures reside in a web-accessible archive to easily facilitate
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real-time, browser-accessible sharing and analysis. Their system most closely relates to
our system, but unlike UseTube, we redact sensitive regions from captured data.
2.4 Deidentifying Data
In the medical domain, a large body of work relates to deidentifying protected health infor-
mation (PHI) in electronic documents [42]. Approaches for finding PHI within documents
falls into two broad categories: comparison using a dictionary of terms and application of
natural language processing (NLP) that uses machine learning and training datasets to build
a language model. The MITRE Corporation developed the “Scrubber toolkit” that relies
largely on the NLP approach to find and then deidentify documents [6].
Our work approaches the deidentification problem from a complementary angle. Our
system does not interpret data; rather, it redacts all text within an application screenshot and
allows a domain expert to unredact portions relevant to their needs. By taking this approach,
we leave difficult judgment calls to humans and provide a default deny-all, “what-you-
see-is-what-you-get” (WYSIWG) tool that can simplify the process of sharing screenshots
among application stakeholders. Our system performs the bulk of redaction for an end-user
and leaves them with any customization they wish. In future work we plan to study and
augment our system with a form of deidentification found in existing scientific literature.
Document redaction products such as Rapid Redact [48] and brava! [33] exist in the
commercial marketplace. These products parse document structure and can help users
achieve WYSIWYG. In contrast, our system redacts material from images directly (there
is typically no hidden structure); it neither interprets nor parses document structures. Our
system is principally concerned with redacting screen images and videos that contain a mix
of opaque image content which depends on the visual nature of open applications.
Finally, NSA has published a document that describes how to properly redact Word
2007 documents [45]. This manual process attempts to remove any hidden content from a
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document.
2.5 Anonymity
Deidentified data records can still contain visual information that reveals sensitive data. In
her ground-breaking work, Sweeney recognized this problem in the context of databases
that contain a mix of sensitive and unsensitive records. She proposed a technique to k-
anonymize data so that any record within a set is indistinguishable from (k − 1) other
records within the set [52].
Machanavajjhala et al have extended Sweeney’s work in what they call l-diversity to fur-
ther tune sensitive, k-anonymized records so that k-anonymity exists among combinations
of sensitive and non-sensitive fields [41]. Such additional protection can eliminate infor-
mation leaks where an observer has knowledge about an unsensitive field and uses that
knowledge to narrow their search results to a list of identical sensitive fields and thus reveal
a sensitive value.
In some circumstances, redacted text in our system may suffer from a visual form of the
k-anonymity problem. Visual metadata such as column and row arrangements of redacted
data may help an observer learn information our system intended to hide. In Subsec-
tions 7.2.4 and 8.1.3 we discuss this problem in more detail and using empirical evidence,
describe how we might add visual k-anonymity to the list of system features.
2.6 Document Analysis
The International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR) has many
papers and competitions related to the problem applying machine learning and computer
vision to analyze documents analysis [5]. A 2003 competition sponsored by ICDAR has
datasets available for optical character recognition (OCR), word recognition, text locating,
and other purposes [4]. These datasets do not apply directly to our problem; we segment
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text, in some cases have a more constrained segmentation problem, and do not apply OCR.
In general, the problem of document analysis and recognition is well-studied. As men-
tioned earlier, we begin to investigate screenshot structure to k-anonymize layout and leave
in-depth document-reconstruction as subject of future work.
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Chapter 3
System Overview
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the system architecture, design goals, functional-
ity, and implementation. We begin by discussing the architecture in Section 3.1 followed by
design goals in Section 3.2 and functionality in Section 3.3. We conclude with an overview
of the implementation in Section 3.4.
3.1 Architecture
The architecture of our system consists of data capture and text-redaction components.
Figure 3.1 describes these within the context of a larger vision and includes functionality
that is subject of future work. Figure 3.2 examines more closely the subject of this work and
highlights how our instrumentation augments a computer to collect keyboard/video/mouse
(KVM) data.
The design described by Figure 3.2 may provide value in industries such as power where
additional software installed in a real-time system can create unacceptable processing de-
lays. Our design may also benefit industries such as medicine, where instrumented systems
may lack standards-compliance and interoperability, are regulated and thus cannot readily
accept capture software, contain many screen and document formats of interest, or may
lack documentation and support.
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Figure 3.1: Our system within the context of a larger vision. The figure includes a “Log-
ging Service” that interacts with a monitored system, a “Sharing Service” that functions as a
repository for application stakeholders to share redacted screenshots, a monitored system, an
end-user who wish their system to be monitored and a web-browser through which the end-
user can interact with logging and sharing services. Within this big-picture context, internal
components of the bold box labeled “Logging Service” define the contribution of this work.
A sample usage scenario follows the numerical labels in the following steps. 1) An adminis-
trator enables the “Logging Service.” 2) An end-user triggers the “Logging Service” to log a
monitored host. 3) The “Logging Service” connects to the monitored host and begins logging.
4) The end-user interacts with monitored system. 5) The end-user reviews and possibly edits
logged data. 6) The end-user publishes redacted screenshots.
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Figure 3.2: Instrumenting a computer system. The capture instrumentation, which is a sub-
component of the “Logging Service” in Figure 3.1, listens to keyboard and mouse input from
devices and video output received by the computer. Consequently, it can remain system inde-
pendent and simplify capture on closed or certified systems where special software instrumen-
tation may not be installed. Finally, the dashed lines represent our contribution—the ability
to capture KVM events.
As instrumentation captures data, it flows through the set of processing steps outlined
in Figure 3.3. These steps prepare traces for sharing among application stakeholders as
depicted in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Information flow through the capture system. As input, the redaction process takes
raw KVM data or segmented KVM data received from a windows API. Segmented KVM data
would be available only with window-system API access. After the system redacts imagery, it
logs the trace to disk where it may eventually be read and transmitted to a “Sharing Service”
as depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Design Goals
The system should redact text from screen captures, and to facilitate API-independence,
the redaction technique should operate on raw images. When an accessible windows API
exists, the redaction process will simply have less work to do. This design facilitates the
study of usable security in systems such as medical or power, where certification, real-
time performance requirements, or lack of documentation and support limit programmatic
access to the system.
Finally, our system should function without severely impacting the performance of the
instrumented system or normal end-user workflows. Negative impacts may cause users to
disable the instrumentation and negate its benefits. We hope to avoid this problem.
3.3 Functionality
Our system includes functionality essential to implementing screen capture for sensitive
systems. The basic steps of instrumenting such systems include screen capture, image pro-
cessing and editing, and data sharing. Capture through KVM, camera, or a native capture
application all represent ways the system could obtain screenshot data. We implemented
KVM capture because it enables systematic logging of existing systems without their mod-
ification.
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Figure 3.4: Sample redacted screenshot. The top screenshot demonstrates a Gmail mailbox
and the bottom, a text-redacted version of the same screenshot. Computer vision can find text
within a screenshot. Then the system can apply a block-effect to redact text at the discovered
locations and log the resultant image to disk.
After capture, the system processes an image to find and redact text as demonstrated in
Figure 3.4. Additionally, the system may search for regions within the image that match
a set of image snippets or “templates” and count, redact, or unredact matching regions.
Finally, a user may wish to edit the image and further redact or unredact a portion of the
processed screenshot. Various components of the system correspond to these possible steps
and we discuss each of them in subsequent chapters.
3.4 Implementation
The bulk of our system implementation relies on a mixture of C and C++ code span-
ning multiple open-source libraries and custom-developed libraries and applications. Ap-
pendix A describes the principal set of libraries that support our effort, which include
boost [54], C++ STL [2], OpenCV [16], liblinear [28], and CGAL [1, 37, 70]. Appendix C
describes applications we developed to manipulate screenshots and analyze the system.
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Altogether, we implemented approximately 9000 lines of code.
We rely on a number of open-source tools to edit, build, debug, and analyze code.
Emacs [59] serves as our code editor, gcc [56] compiles source, and cmake [38] and ulti-
mately gnu make [60] function as the build system. Gdb [57] helps debug code; dtrace [50],
Bash [55], and perl [24] support analysis; and gnuplot [20] generates plots.
To remain system independent, we implemented certain functionality with higher-level
APIs; our development environment is a MacBook Pro running OS X 10.6 with 8 GB
of memory.1 Certain, low-level OpenCV routines rely on system libraries, but these are
transparent to our code—OpenCV is cross-platform.
1We upgraded to OS X 10.7 midway through development and analysis.
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Chapter 4
Screen Capture
In the last chapter, we described a high-level architecture and design of our work. We also
described how it fits within the context of a larger system that includes components to share
redacted screen captures. In this chapter, we describe the capture functionality our work
implements. Section 4.1 provides an overview of capture and Section 4.2 describes our
capture technique.
4.1 Overview
The action of screen capture requires a subject of capture, a method to collect and com-
municate screenshots, and a system to process and store them. In some cases, a single
computer may fulfill all three requirements. In this chapter, we discuss the second one in
depth.
At least three approaches exist to collect and communicate screenshots. In the first ap-
proach, an end-user executes a capture application running directly on the capture target.
The application can use system APIs to collect pixels associated with visual objects such as
screens or windows. As we describe in Chapter 2, many third-party and operating system
applications exist for this purpose.
Taking pictures with a hand-held camera is a second method to gather screenshots.
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Screenshots collected using this method may include discoloration, natural artifacts due
to the environment and camera position, screenshot orientations with complex angles and
lighting, artifacts outside of the physical screen, or other problems.
Capturing content through a hardware keyboard/video/mouse (KVM) device or
software-based virtual network computer (VNC) interface represents a third approach to
collect and communication screenshots. Our system implements this remote-capture ap-
proach, which enables screenshot collection on instrumented systems that lack standards-
compliance and interoperability, are regulated and thus cannot readily accept capture soft-
ware, or may lack documentation and support.
4.2 VNC-based Screen Capture
Our system relies on a virtual network computer (VNC) arrangement to capture screen
material from a remote host [49]. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of this VNC-based
approach. In a nutshell, VNC defines a protocol for transporting a computer’s framebuffer,
keyboard, and mouse data over the network. By building a system with this protocol, our
system can capture and operate on all KVM events in a system-independent fashion.
VNC client
Operating
System
Capture System
Operating
System
VNC server
Capture Target
Network
Connection, 
Handshake, 
Screen updates
Figure 4.1: VNC-based screen capture. The arrangement is comprised of the capture system
and its target. The capture system executes a VNC client and the target executes a VNC
server. The server exports the target’s KVM over a TCP network connection as a stream
of bitmap updates using the RFB protocol [49]. Initially, the client connects to the server.
Then the endpoints proceed through a handshake and finally begin the screen update process.
Periodically, the VNC client polls the server for updates and the server responds at its chosen
time, typically when changes occur on the target.
We chose software-based VNC over hardware-based KVM because the software re-
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source was readily available for development. Additionally, if we build a prototype system
that redacts imagery collected from software-based VNC, then the work should readily
apply to hardware-based KVM. The software interface to the screen capture agent would
change, but the rest of the system would remain identical.
In our test configuration, Mac OS X 10.6 functions as the “Capture System” and a
Ubuntu Linux 9.10 running within a VMware [64] instance on the “Capture System” serves
as the “Capture Target.” The application x11vnc [36] serves as the VNC server on “Capture
Target,” and our code implements a VNC client as part of an application called “scrubs,”
which we describe in detail in Chapter 6. The client implements read-only functionality
and therefore does not pass keyboard or mouse events from the VNC client to the VNC
server.
Our client connects to the VNC server using TCP and currently does not implement con-
nection security. TLS [26] or SSH-based [69] security are common protocols we could use
to do so. After connecting, the endpoints proceed through a handshake phase and negotiate
the protocol version “RFB 003.008\n” and the “raw” pixel format to transfer screen up-
dates from the server to the client without compression. Compressed image formats exist
to reduce network traffic, and we leave their implementation as future work.
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Chapter 5
Text Redaction
In the last chapter, we described how the system captures screenshots. In this chapter we
explain the core system-function of text redaction (or simply “redaction”) in detail and
the following three ways our system accomplishes it: Canny Edge Detection [17], Gabor-
wavelet [30] filtering with unsupervised classification, and Gabor-wavelet filtering with
supervised classification [34].
Section 5.1 overviews text redaction. Section 5.2 describes redaction using Canny edge
detection. Section 5.3 describes Gabor-wavelet filtering with unsupervised classification.
Finally, Section 5.3.4 describes Gabor-wavelet filtering with supervised classification and
concludes the chapter.
5.1 Overview
Text redaction is a fundamental aspect of the system because it removes sensitive text from
screen capture data, relieving the end-user from manually redacting screen captures before
sharing. By default, the system implements a “deny-all” policy and thus redacts all text
it finds. An end-user can then “unredact” small regions as necessary to facilitate their
conversation. Instead of forcing end-users to redact large portions of the screen by hand, we
redact all text and allow an end-user to unredact small portions as necessary. This naturally
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reduces the workload required to share screenshots among application stakeholders.
Additionally, “deny-all” mirrors a common policy in domains such as networking where
firewalls are configured typically to deny-all and whitelist (the analogue of unredact) only
a small number of network ports. Because redaction affects text and a small number of
icons, screen context remains despite removal of potentially sensitive data.
In a different approach to redaction, our system could simply redact an entire screen (e.g.,
turn the entire screen black) and the end-user could unredact whichever small piece sup-
ports their needs. We believe this approach provides too little screen context to observers.
Unredacted, unsensitive screen data provides context to application stakeholders that may
help focus their discussion. However, our system can support this approach without major
modifications.
Image-based text redaction is comprised of two principle steps: finding text in an image,
also known as text segmentation, and recoloring segmented image regions to “remove” text.
After segmented pixels have been identified, a system can easily change their values to a
single color such as black. Redacting images using this approach ensures that no “hidden”
text or other data exists within the final redacted product—WYSIWYG.1 Next we discuss
three approaches to accomplish WYSIWYG redaction of images.
5.2 Redaction Using Canny Edge Detection
In our first approach to segment text, we rely on the Canny edge detection algorithm [17].
Canny finds edges in an image by analyzing its intensity gradient and marking edges at
gradient high points. To maintain legibility, screenshot text exists with an intensity contrast
in relation to its background and thus creates gradient high points. Canny finds these high
points and thus can segment screenshot text.
The entire Canny-redaction process includes multiple steps. First, the system converts a
1This statement assumes technology such as steganography does not visually hide data within an image.
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color screenshot to 8-bit gray scale. It then applies a Gaussian blur using a 3x3 window
to reduce image noise—Canny output qualitatively contained less noise with this initial
blurring step. Next, the system executes Canny using low and high threshold values of 100
and 300 respectively to find edges—the values provide qualitatively-reasonable redaction
results for a variety of desktop screenshots. Gradient magnitudes greater than the high
threshold are considered edges and traced throughout the image. Values above the low
threshold denote edges that branch from an existing trace process. Together, these tunable
values reduce noise during edge detection.
After executing the Canny algorithm, the system finds connected components (polygons)
using Canny output and an algorithm suitable for doing so [51]. For each polygon discov-
ered, the system computes a bounding rectangle and draws a filled version of the rectangle
into an image “redaction mask.” Finally, the redaction mask is applied to the original image
to produce a redacted image.
OpenCV implements Canny edge detection over 8-bit gray-scale images, finds contours
within an image using a well-know method [51], and given a set of points, computes a
bounding boxes. Thus, the library provides a useful toolbox for the Canny-redaction ap-
proach.
Figure 5.1 lists three screenshot snippets from the Wikipedia article about the Canny
algorithm [66]. The first snippet is the article, the second is the redaction rectangles com-
puted over Canny output, and the third is the redacted version of the article. Figure 5.2 lists
the rectangles and redacted screen from snippets of a gmail inbox.
In Figure 5.1, notice how redaction includes a globe in the upper right corner. In Fig-
ure 5.2, Canny found a large rectangle that outlines the message box listing. This rectangle
translates to a large black rectangle in the redacted image and destroys potentially useful
screenshot context. These facts demonstrate that Canny finds any edge, whether text or not,
and consequently the algorithm produces false positives for text redaction.
Additionally, Canny did not detect faint lines separating sections of the screen in Fig-
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Rectangle-enclosed rectangles
Redacted entire globe
White space between words
Figure 5.1: Canny-based text redaction. The top image is a screenshot snippet from the
Wikipedia page about Canny edge detection [66]. The second image depicts the rectangles
that result from processing the first image with Canny edge detection, polygon detection, and
polygon bounding with rectangles. The third image derives from filling the rectangles in the
second image and then applying the second image as a redaction mask to the first. Canny
missed some true edges throughout the image (false negatives for edge detection) and added
edges where text does not exist near the globe (false positive for text detection). Finally, notice
whitespace between words and tiny rectangles enclosed within larger ones.
ure 5.1. These are false negatives for edge detection, but not for text detection. In Fig-
ure 5.2, false negatives exist for text detection in the upper left corner of the screenshot.
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Detected large rectangle
Undetected text
Figure 5.2: More canny-based text redaction. The top image is a screenshot snippet from a
gmail inbox. The second image depicts the rectangles computed over a gmail mailbox and
the second image depicts the redacted mailbox. Canny missed text (false negative for text
redaction) in the upper left portion of the screen and detected a large rectangle that includes
a majority of the screen (false positive for text redaction).
Also, notice how many words in a line are separated by whitespace. Canny does not
collapse or merge nearby edges. However, it does detect letters that have been visually
truncated, such as those at the bottom of the screenshot snippet. Such letter fractions still
produce variations in the image intensity gradient in a way that Canny detects.
Finally, the Canny algorithm sometimes finds interior edges of letters such as “p” which
produce very small rectangles embedded in larger ones. We will discuss many of these
issues further in Chapter 7.
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5.3 Redaction using Gabor-Wavelet Filtering
The next method we explored to segment text was based on Gabor wavelets [30] with
unsupervised classification. The underlying idea is to treat text as texture and use Gabor
wavelets to segment texture. We followed the description provided by Jain and Bhattachar-
jee in 1992 [34] and modified it as necessary to produce working results. Before we delve
into our approach, we first explain Gabor wavelets briefly.
5.3.1 Gabor Wavelets
In general, a wavelet is a wave with some orientation and frequency that when convolved
with an image, resonates and creates a detectable signal. Gabor wavelets, which are com-
monly used in image processing, are comprised of a sin wave modulated by a Gaussian
envelope and for our application, they use a two-dimensional envelope. Both real and
complex components comprise the wavelet, but in following [34], we only use the real,
symmetric (cos) component.
Equation 5.1 shows the wavelet equation h(x, y) that we used. Wavelength (λ) and
orientation (θ ) comprise its tunable parameters in our application.
h(x, y) = exp
(
−1
2
(
x20
σ 2x
+ y
2
0
σ 2y
))
cos
(
2pi
λ
x0 + φ
)
, (5.1)
27
where
x0 = x cos(θ)+ y sin(θ)
y0 = −x sin(θ)+ y cos(θ)
σx = λ
pi
√
log(2)
2
2b+1
2b−1
σy = σx
γ
b = 1.0
γ = 0.5
φ = 0
The wavelet filter is computed and then then convolved with the target image. The size
of the filter is odd in both the x and y dimensions and its independent variables are n (the
number of standard deviations of the Gaussian to consider) and the wave orientation θ .
The following equations describe the filter size precisely, where the filter dimensions are
(xmax − xmin + 1)× (ymax − ymin + 1).
xmax =
⌈
max
(
1,max
(|nσx cos(θ)| , ∣∣nσy sin(θ)∣∣))⌉
ymax =
⌈
max
(
1,max
(|nσx sin(θ)| , ∣∣nσy cos(θ)∣∣))⌉
xmin = −xmax
ymin = −ymax
n = 5
The approach for defining the filter and its window were taken from a combination of
two sources [34,67]. We use n = 5 standard deviations as recommended by the paper [34].
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5.3.2 Creating Feature Vectors
In summary, the system segments text with the following steps. First, it filters an image
with each Gabor filter. Then, each filtered image is thresholded, transformed into features,
and stacked so that each pixel now has a “feature vector” with dimension equal to the
number of filters. Next it appends each pixel’s x and y position to each feature vector,
shifts each vector dimension to zero mean and unit standard deviation, and classifies pixels
as “text” or “not text” using either supervised or unsupervised means.
During the filter process, a collection of Gabor filters with varying parameters forms a
filter bank through which an image is processed. The bank enables detection of image
features of different frequencies and orientations.
When an individual filter is convolved with an image, the system extrapolates border
pixels to increase the image size and prevent the filter from “falling off” the image edge.
Our system relies on border replication, because the technique produces numerically useful
results in combination with the Gabor filter—other extrapolation approaches failed in our
experiments.
Each filter produces a “filtered image” that corresponds to one parameter combination.
Through qualitative analysis, we settled on parameters
λ ∈ {.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0, 16.0, 32.0}
and
θ ∈ {0.0, 45.0, 90.0, 135.0}
for a filter-bank size of 28 filters (|λ| × |θ |).
The parameter θ varies according to the paper [34] to detect signals oriented in a uniform
variety of positions. In contrast, the parameter λ does not follow the paper. Instead the
paper specifies a wave frequencyµ0 and derives parameters from it to form features images.
We explain more about our choice shortly.
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We chose λ to vary by powers of 2 in order to form a dyadic collection of filters that span
a collection of feature sizes. We had trouble realizing the parameter description of [34]
and found that our parameters produced usable feature images. Through qualitative exper-
iments, we found our chosen values to detect features among a collection of screenshots.
After the filter process, each filter image is thresholded using Equation 5.2 to form
“thresholded images.” In the equation, α = .25, t is a pixel value. The result of apply-
ing the equation to the image is that each pixel takes on its new thresholded value.
ψ(t) =
∣∣∣∣1− exp−2αt1+ exp−2αt
∣∣∣∣ (5.2)
After thresholding, the windowing function defined by Equation 5.3 is applied to each
thresholded image to compute the “texture energy” in small intervals about each pixel in
what the paper calls a “feature image.” The kth feature image, represented by ek(x, y)
is generated by summing the thresholded values in M × M windows (Wxy) about each
pixel (x, y). Note that rk(a, b) is the kth filtered image, and ψ is described in Equation 5.2.
ek(x, y) = 1M2
∑
(a,b)∈Wxy
|ψ(rk(a, b))| , 1, . . . , n (5.3)
To compute this summation, the system convolves a M × M window of ones with the
thresholded image and multiplies each resultant pixel value by 1M2 . As with all other con-
volution operations, the system replicates the border before processing pixels that cause the
window Wxy to fall outside the image.
Then, the feature images are stacked so that each pixel consists of a 28 dimension feature
vector and the x and y pixel position of each pixel is appended to its feature vector to create
a final feature-vector size 30. The vector dimensions are modified to zero mean and unit
standard deviation to normalize the numeric effect of features during computations. Our
system differs from the Jain and Bhattacharjee system [34] from this point on.
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5.3.3 Unsupervised Classification
After deriving a collection of (imgrows · imgcols) feature vectors as described above, the
system uses the kmeans algorithm [40] to cluster features into k classes, where k ∈ {2, 3}.
The algorithm assigns each pixel a class label i ∈ [0, k − 1], and one class may correspond
to text if text exists. In the paper [34], the authors clustered into 3 classes using a different
clustering technique and chose the class labeled 2 (using 1-indexed label names) as text
for all of their analysis. In our qualitative experiments, we found that some screenshots
clustered better visually into k = 2 classes and others into k = 3 classes.
During kmeans clustering, the system relied on stopping conditions of the first of 10000
iterations or an error rate of .0001. We chose the initial cluster centers using a more recent
technique [13] and ran the algorithm one time to the stopping conditions before assigning
labels.
After running kmeans, the label i corresponding to text must be chosen manually. The
designated “text” pixels form a mask that redacts text when combined with the original
image. Unlike the Canny-based approach, no polygons are found within the redaction
mask, no bounding rectangles are drawn into the mask, little white space exists between
adjacent words, and fewer non-text objects are labeled as text. Visually, Gabor-filtering
redacts more precisely than Canny-based filtering. Figure 5.3 revisits Figure 5.1 using
Gabor-based redaction where k = 2 and i = 0 and Figure 5.4 revisits Figure 5.2 using
k = 2 and i = 1.
In Figure 5.3, note how Gabor-based redaction fills whitespace between words in sen-
tences, does not redact objects such as the globe, and does redact fractional characters. It
does not redact large rectangles from the screen as Canny-based redaction did in Figure 5.2.
In Figure 5.4, note how false negatives (text that should be redacted but was not) exist
with certain font scales and textures in the upper left corner and also throughout lighter
message-body in the message lines.
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Fractional characters redacted
Reduced whitespace between words
Does not redact entire globe
Figure 5.3: Gabor-based text redaction. The top image is the same unredacted snippet as seen
in Figure 5.1. The second image depicts a Gabor-redacted version of the first image. Gabor-
based redaction does not redact large objects such as the globe, connects whitespace between
words in sentences, and redacts fractional characters found at the edge of the screenshot.
5.3.4 Supervised Classification
The downside to unsupervised classification is multi-fold: k and i are chosen manually; the
approach classifies pixels into k clusters whether or not text exists; and finally, the feature
count can easily surpass 1 million with modern screen resolutions, and thus kmeans can be
slower than possible alternatives. We will return to the topic of performance in Chapter 7,
but for now, we describe the supervised classification technique our system implements.
In the supervised approached, image feature vectors are generated as in the unsupervised
approach. Instead of kmeans, however, each feature is fed to a trained classifier that labels
the pixel as “text” or “not text.” All pixels labeled as “text” are converted to the color black
and all other pixels maintain their values.
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Undetected text
Partially redacted text
Figure 5.4: More Gabor-based text redaction. The top image is the same unredacted snippet
as seen in Figure 5.2. The second image depicts a Gabor-redacted version of the first image.
Gabor-based redaction missed the large gmail text and small “by Google” text below the gmail
text. It partially redacted lighter message text in the inbox. Note that Gabor-based redaction
did not compute a large rectangle of false positives as Canny did in Figure 5.2.
This supervised approach to classification solves many of the problems of unsupervised
Gabor. Parameters k and i no longer exist, so the manual step of choosing them no longer
exists. The supervised approach classifies pixels as “text” or “not text” (where the class
label 1 corresponds to “text” and the class label −1 corresponds to “not text”). Therefore,
all pixels will be classified, whether or not text exists in the image. Finally, classifying
pixels with a supervised classifier can be faster than running kmeans over the same set of
pixels. We discuss classification performance in Subsection 7.3.1.
We chose a linear support vector machine (SVM) to label pixels as members of classes
{−1, 1}. The output of our training phase tells us which if any filters do not contribute to the
resultant SVM and can be removed from the filtering process. We experimented with the
following two of many classifiers provided by the liblinear library [28]: (a) L1-regularized
L2-loss support vector classification and (b) L1-regularized logistic regression.
We chose these classifiers because after training, they can contain a 0-valued parameter
for each feature that remained unused during the training process. Such features can be
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eliminated from input during future predictions and thus not computed in the first place.
Their absence reduces computational overhead in the running system.
To begin machine learning, we first partition our set of screenshots into a training set and
testing set. Then to train the classifier, we generate a set of ground-truth feature vectors and
labels from the training set. We generate ground-truth by manually choosing the features
and labels associated with “best” redaction results using the unsupervised classification
technique described earlier. This ground-truth is fed into a program we implemented that
interfaces liblinear to train and save the resultant classifier. The classifier can then be run
on any image using another program we wrote to classify pixels as {−1, 1} and thus redact
text.
Among the two classifiers listed, (a) used all features and (b) used all but one feature
(feature 12 of 30) in the resultant classifier. Because the savings would be a single feature
for a single model, we did not eliminate it.
During the SVM training process, we used default liblinear values for all SVM parame-
ters. We experimented with cross-validation to tune the constant C in the SVM expression
(see liblinear for details [28]). However, we experienced minimal performance improve-
ments and therefore relied on default values to train each classifier.
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Chapter 6
Editing Images
In Chapter 5 we described in detail how our system redacts text from screenshots. Either
during or after the redaction process, users may wish to edit redacted imagery. Thus, we
have developed a tool called “scrubs” for doing so.
Additionally, we found visualization tools useful as we progressed in the research of
“Screen Capture for Sensitive Systems.” They enable exploration of new concepts and
help uncover positive findings and problems with research ideas. Thus, for the purpose of
exploration and for end-user use, we developed a tool called “five in one.”
All tools we describe here are prototypes and would need additional modifications to
meet production quality and usability standards. However, the tools demonstrate important
and useful functionality that should exist in production grade tools. In this chapter we de-
scribe each in turn. Section 6.1 discusses “scrubs,” and Section 6.2 discusses “five in one.”
6.1 scrubs
scrubs captures and enables screenshot edits in real-time. It uses a VNC client as described
in Chapter 4 to collect screenshots from a capture target. Figure 6.1 depicts an example of
scrubs in action.
A user invokes scrubs on the commandline with the usage defined in Figure 6.2. Imme-
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Figure 6.1: Text-redaction using scrubs. The top image depicts a screen capture target exe-
cuting a Google web search about the RFB protocol. The machine runs Ubuntu 9.10 linux in
VMware on a MacBook Pro with OS X 10.7. The redacted version of the web query is pro-
duced by scrubs running natively on the same MacBook Pro. The linux machine exports its
screen over the network using a VNC server called x11vnc [36] and scrubs connects over the
network to this server and receives screen updates from it using the RFB protocol [49]. The
bottom machine reflects updates made to the top machine in real-time, but in redacted form.
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Usage: scrubs [OPTIONS]
-h, --host=HOST log video of this host (default
localhost)
-p, --port=PORT port to connect (default 5900)
-a, --autosave autosave every record_window/2
seconds (default 0)
-w, --record_window=TIME sliding record window
(default 10sec;
TIME < 0 for infinite window)
-f, --file=FILE avi file to store logged video
(default [date-host].avi)
-n, --no_viewer DO NOT display a viewer while
logging (default display
viewer)
Help options:
-?, --help Show this help message
--usage Display brief usage message
Figure 6.2: scrubs usage. scrubs relies on libpopt to parse usage and display the content
of this figure. Upon execution, scrubs connects to VNC server <host> at port <port>.
<record window> defines how many seconds of screenshot video should be save to disk dur-
ing a save operation, and if autosave is enabled, scrubs will save the past <record window>
seconds of screen video to disk every <record window>/2 seconds. <file> is the name of the
file that will receive screen video whenever a file is written. scrubs writes video in raw format
within an AVI container and overwrites the file on each subsequent autosave operation. Fi-
nally, <no viewer> instructs scrubs to log without displaying the viewer (which also servers
as the video editor).
diately upon execution, scrubs creates a thread using pthreads [61] to request and receive
screen updates from the remote VNC server. After establishing the VNC connection and
upon receiving updates, the VNC thread places them in a queue to be processed by the
main scrubs thread.
To prevent deadlock and synchronization issues, the queue is protected by a mutex. The
VNC thread acquires the mutex before it enqueues data and releases it afterwards. The main
thread acquires the same mutex before it removes updates to be processed and releases it
afterwards. To reduce the number of mutex operations, the main thread removes all screen
updates each time it access the queue. It places them on a data structure that remains
unmodified by the VNC thread.
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While the VNC thread sends screen update requests and handles their subsequent receipt,
the main thread iterates through an event loop where it processes any incoming screen up-
dates, updates its display of redacted data to a compendium of all the latest screen updates,
waits for keystrokes and mouse events from the user, handles any such events, and au-
tosaves if the user enabled that option. Displaying a compendium of latest updates main-
tains a visually accurate and snappy viewer, while storing all updates in memory ordered
by receipt from the server, enables lossless video creation.
6.1.1 Editing with scrubs
The scrubs user can edit video through keyboard and mouse interactions with the scrubs
viewer.1 All edits to a video are applied to all subsequent screen updates of the current ses-
sion, and a “session” is simply a commandline invocation of scrubs. Table 6.1 describes the
key events processed by scrubs and Figure 6.3 demonstrates how edit mode allows a user
to both redact and unredact regions of their choosing. Depending on the current operating
mode, the mouse allows a user to create custom redaction rectangles on the screen.
The scrubs editor functions in two separate modes: “edit” and “record” and the ‘e’
keystroke toggles between them. Record is the default mode and displays screen updates
as the capture target changes. Edit mode pauses display of screen updates and allows the
user to click and drag the mouse to define custom redaction and/or unredaction rectangles.
To visually denote edit mode, the system displays a shade of white over the entire viewer
display. While paused for user edits, the system continually processes and maintains re-
ceived screen updates in the background, and upon returning to record mode, the system
displays a compilation of all updates processed during pause.
1Because they are one-in-the-same, we use the term “viewer” and “editor” interchangeably.
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Key/Mouse Description
‘q’ or ‘Q’ Do not save and quit scrubs immediately.
‘e’ Toggle “edit mode”, which is used to create custom redac-
tion and unredaction regions on the screen. All edits are
permanent in the current viewing session after toggling
out of edit mode.
‘s’ In record mode, save the current <record window> sec-
onds of video.
‘ ’ In “edit mode” and while the mouse is dragged, tog-
gle the color of the current redaction rectangle between
black (redact) and the image behind the redaction rectan-
gle (unredact).
Escape or
right-mouse
In “edit mode,” quit the current mouse-drag operation
without updating the screen.
left-drag Define custom redaction regions
Table 6.1: Key events processed by scrubs. “Key/Mouse” is the key or mouse event that
initiates an action and “Description” summarizes the action.
6.2 five in one
The five in one tool manipulates static images and also serves as a tool to explore research
ideas. A user invokes five in one on the commandline with the usage defined in Figure 6.4.
After the image is loaded, five in one applies Canny-based redaction as described in Sec-
tion 5.2 and displays outlines of the redaction rectangles in the five in one editor window.
Figure 6.5 uses the screenshot from Figure 5.1 to demonstrate five in one look-and-feel.
Table 6.2 lists editor modes a user can toggle with various keystrokes. For each mode, the
table lists one or more figures that demonstrate mode functionality. Table 6.3 describes the
key and mouse events processed by five in one—immediately upon execution, five in one
begins an event loop and waits for user and mouse input.
The primary mode of the tool is edit, and in this mode, rectangles appear red, selected
rectangles blue, matched templates green, and custom-drawn rectangles red. When drawn
filled, all but redaction rectangles maintain their outlined color; red-outlined redaction rect-
angles become black filled rectangles.
five in one allows a user to create “templates” (see ‘t’ in Table 6.3) that can be saved
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Custom redacted region
Custom unredacted regions
Figure 6.3: Custom redaction and unredaction of the top image in Figure 6.1. When a user
clicks and drags the mouse in edit mode, they produce a custom unredaction region. By tap-
ping the space key before the left mouse has been released, the region flips between redaction
and unredaction colors. After a region is defined, the system searches the unredacted image
for any matches to the unredacted form of the selected region. If it finds one, it copies the
user’s custom region to the matching area. Note that red highlighting-rectangles disappear
when a user hits “Escape” during a drag operation or when the user exits edit mode (with
keystroke ’e’).
to file and redacted automatically from many images upon image load. Each template
is maintained by five in one as an OpenCV matrix and templates are serialized into the
binary format for file storage described in Subsection A.2.1 of Appendix A. The template
file contains a list of these matrices preceded by a 4-byte count of templates in network byte
order. Any templates that were loaded on program start are saved along with any newly
defined templates. Because of this behavior, template-saving is an append operation.
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Usage: five_in_one <img> [templates]
<img> the image to process
[templates] the file to retrieve templates from
and write templates into
Figure 6.4: five in one usage. Invoke five in one to process image <img>. Optionally load
image templates found in file [templates] and wherever a match is found in <img>, write a
redaction rectangle. No changes are every saved to the original image <img>.
Red redaction rectangles
Blue mouse crosshairs
Selected rectangles 
w/ mouse drag
Figure 6.5: Default five in one look-and-feel. When the editor executes, it begins in edit mode.
Redaction rectangles are unfilled and painted red. A blue crosshair appears to help the user
align the mouse as they manipulate the image. The user can drag the mouse to select rectangles
for subsequent operations. A selected rectangle turns blue, and the “Escape” key deselects all
selected rectangles and reverts their color from blue to red.
Mode Figure(s) Description
edit 6.6, 6.7,
6.8, 6.9
The default mode used to merge selected rectangles, se-
lect and delete redaction rectangles, define templates, and
copy selected rectangles to matching regions of the image.
rectangle 6.10 Display image only.
redaction-only 6.10 Display rectangles only.
draw 6.11 Draw custom redaction rectangles.
grid 6.12 Display a grid.
fill 6.13 Display filled rectangles.
Table 6.2: five in one editor modes. “mode” is the mode name, “Figures” denote which Fig-
ures demonstrate each mode, and “Description” summarizes mode functionality.
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Key/Mouse Mode Description
‘m’ edit Merge selected rectangles.
‘r’ rectangle Enable and disable display of redaction rectangles.
‘R’ redaction-only Enable and disable display of the underlying image.
‘f’ fill Switch between display of filled and outlined redaction
rectangles.
‘Q’ or ’q’ any Exit five in one immediately without saving.
‘d’ draw The crosshair changes color to red and dragging allows
the user to create custom redaction rectangles.
‘g’ grid Draw a black grid on the screen using a 20-pixel row and
column step.
‘+’ or ‘-’ any Increase and decrease the line width of red redaction rect-
angles.
‘L’ any Save image layout analysis to file. See Subsection 7.2.4
for more information about the analysis.
‘T’ any Thin-out superfluous redaction rectangles. Those rectan-
gles contained wholly within another rectangle will be
subsumed and eliminated. Each newly created redaction
rectangles grows in size with each ‘T’ operation. See Fig-
ure 6.14
‘c’ edit Copy selected redaction rectangles to image regions that
match the unredacted image under the redaction rectangle.
‘t’ edit Append selected redaction rectangles to the list of tem-
plates. On image load, the system draws redaction rect-
angles over regions where a template matches image con-
tent.
‘s’ any Save the current screen as displayed (with all redaction
rectangles but without a crosshair cursor).
‘S’ any Save the list of templates to a file as a binary list of
OpenCV matrices preceded by a 4-byte length in network-
byte-order, and remove duplicate templates before saving.
See Subsection A.2.1 for the binary matrix format.
Delete edit Delete the selected redaction rectangle.
Escape or
right-mouse
edit Unselect the current selected rectangles.
left-drag edit Select rectangles.
Table 6.3: Key and mouse events processed by five in one. “Key/Mouse” define the event
five in one processes, “Mode” defines the mode associated with the event, and “Description”
summarizes the action initiated by the event.
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1 2 3
Escape‘m’Select
Figure 6.6: Merge redaction rectangles. The user selects a set of rectangles to merge and
types the key ‘m’ to merge them into the largest rectangle that bounds the selected set. After
merging, the new rectangle is automatically selected and the user can type the key “Escape”
or click the mouse to deselect it.
1
Select
2
Delete
Figure 6.7: Delete redaction rectangles. The user selects a set of rectangles to delete using the
mouse and types the key “Delete.” At that point, red redaction rectangles are removed from
the image.
21
Select ‘t’
Figure 6.8: Define and copy redaction templates. On image load, five in one matches tem-
plates found in the template file passed on the commandline against the image and places a
redaction rectangle over each region that matches (see Figure 6.4 for usage details). To define
templates, the user selects a set of rectangles with the mouse and types the key ‘t’. The system
highlights the selected rectangles with green and internally marks them as templates. At that
point, the user can save all templates to file for later use by typing the key ‘S’ (including the
templates loaded at application start).
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21
Select ‘c’
Figure 6.9: Copy selected redaction rectangles to matching regions of an image. The user
selects a set of rectangles to copy to matching regions of the image and types the key ‘c’ to
copy them. The system then matches the image pixel-by-pixel against the image using the
OpenCV routine “matchTemplate” with the square differencing method and a threshold of
0.00006 as described in Subsection A.2.2. Then, the system draws a redaction rectangle over
any matching regions. After the copy operation, any newly drawn rectangles remain selected
and the user can press the key “Escape” or left or right mouse button to deselect them. In this
figure, the character “n” was selected initially and five in one found the “n” character next to
it and added a redaction rectangle around it.
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Toggle ‘r’ to remove image
Toggle ‘R’ to remove rectangles
Begin in edit mode
Figure 6.10: Toggle display of redaction rectangles and the underlying image. The user can
type the key ‘R’ to toggle between the top and middle image (“rectangles-only mode”)—
display of the underlying redacted image is enabled and disabled. The key ‘r’ toggles between
the top and bottom images (“rectangle mode”)—display of redaction rectangles is enabled and
disabled. When the user exits edit mode, the crosshair disappears and the user no longer has
the ability to manipulate redaction rectangles.
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Toggle ‘d’ for draw mode
Begin in edit mode
Drag mouse to draw new rectangle
Figure 6.11: Draw custom redaction rectangles. The top image displays the redacted image
in edit mode. After typing the key ‘d’, the editor switches to drawing mode. In this mode
the crosshairs change to red and dragging the mouse creates new redaction rectangles. The
bottom image shows one such rectangle. The user can type the “Escape” key during while
dragging to undo the draw operation in progress. A rectangle can be manipulated as any
other displayed rectangle after reverting to edit mode.
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Figure 6.12: Draw a grid. Draw a grid over the displayed image, independent of the existing
mode. Grid line spacing is 20 pixels in both row and column directions, and drawing starts in
the upper left corner.
Figure 6.13: Toggle filled drawing of redaction rectangles. Typing the key ‘f’ toggles fill mode
on and off. The top image shows edit mode with fill turned off. It contains redaction rectangles
in red, a template highlighted in green, and selected rectangles in blue. The bottom image
shows the same image drawn with fill enabled. The green and blue outlined rectangles become
filled with the same color and all red rectangles become filled black ones. The green- and blue-
fill are helpful when searching for rectangles or templates copied around the screen—the user
can quickly and repeatedly toggle ‘f’ to make those rectangles easy to find visually.
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Begin in edit mode
Toggle ‘T’ to thin
Superfluous rectangles subsumed
Enlarged rectangles
Figure 6.14: “Thin out” superfluous rectangles. Begin in edit mode and type the key ‘T’ to
subsume superfluous redaction rectangles. Between the top and bottom images, the rectangle
count dropped from 969 to 237, an ≈ 75% reduction. Note how small rectangles wholly con-
tained within larger ones are subsumed by the larger one after pressing ‘T’. Also, the remain-
ing rectangles have grown by approximately 1 pixel in each direction. Continually pressing
‘T’ will eventually subsume all rectangles into a single rectangle that encompasses the entire
screen. This behavior occurs because of how thinning is implemented. First, the system cre-
ates a filled redaction mask of the image (see key ‘f’), draws new bounding boxes around each
filled rectangle, and replaces all existing redaction rectangles with the new bounding boxes.
Because the new bounding boxes were created by outlining existing rectangles, the new ones
are slightly larger then the ones they replace.
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Chapter 7
Analysis
In the past four chapters we described the text-redaction system, screenshot capture, text-
redaction, and image editing. Now we present empirical analysis of the system. In Sec-
tion 7.1 we overview the analysis, including the data sets and tools we used. In Section 7.2
we analyze many aspects of the image processing, including Canny- and Gabor-based text
redaction, screenshot layout, template matching, and text-redaction impact on visual con-
text. In Section 7.3 we close the chapter by analyzing latency of Canny- and Gabor-based
text redaction, generating Gabor features and loading them from disk, and template match-
ing with different template sizes.
7.1 Overview
Our empirical analysis derives from 80 screenshots captured from two electronic health
record (EHR) systems at two large healthcare providers. Datasets contain fake patient data
but are still considered sensitive and therefore we do not show them within this dissertation.
Appendix B describes the datasets in detail. Additionally, we developed a number of tools
to analyze data and Appendix C describes them.
49
Figure 7.1: Failure of Canny-based text redaction on an EHR screenshot. Both left and right
figures exhibit Canny-based redaction masks on an EHR screenshot from dataset 1. The
left figure depicts the default mask, and the right depicts a hand-tuned version of the same
mask. For many EHR screenshots, Canny-based redaction exhibits similar behavior: the
system redacts all text, but the large false-positive rate eliminates potentially useful screenshot
context. We used five in one (Section 6.2) to eliminate the large redaction rectangle from the
left image and reveal the one on the right.
7.2 Image Analysis
7.2.1 Canny-based Text Redaction
Canny-based text redaction requires improvements before the system can apply it mean-
ingfully to EHR datasets. We discuss them here but leave an improved implementation
and analysis of Canny effectiveness for future work. Figure 7.1 (and 5.2) demonstrates the
principal reason Canny fails: it generates redaction rectangles that subsume large fractions
of a screenshot, which reduce potentially useful, non-private screenshot context.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates another Canny problem: it generates a number of superfluous
rectangles during the redaction process. Reducing their number could improve processing
performance of operations that apply to each rectangle.
We analyzed both problems more closely and found the trends shown in Figure 7.2.
Using them as a guide, the system could automatically remove large redaction rectangles
that include a large fraction of all other rectangles and large rectangles that lead to very
small area ratios.
After thinning rectangles according to these trends, the system could apply the technique
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described in Figure 6.14 and reduce many other superfluous rectangles. In that example,
the rectangle count dropped by approximately 75%.
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Figure 7.2: Relationships of redaction rectangles. The top plot displays the number of redac-
tion rectangles contained with a given redaction rectangle. The x-axis is the fraction of total
redaction rectangles in a screenshot contained wholly within a given redaction rectangle and
the y-axis is a count of x-values. Rectangles that comprise the entire screenshot include all
others and thus appear to the far right on the plot. The second plot displays the ratio of area
for each pair of redaction rectangles in a screenshot. Its x-axis is the area ratio of rectangles
within a given screenshot where one rectangle of the pair wholly contains the other, and the
y-axis is a count of all x-values. Pairs where one rectangle comprises the entire screen can
found on the far left of the plot because of the extreme nature of the ratio. The system could
automatically eliminate redaction rectangles that fall on the far right of the top plot and far
left of the bottom. Both plots were produced using dataset 1.
In another problem demonstrated by Figures 5.1, 7.5, 7.10, or 7.11, Canny leaves whites-
pace between redaction rectangles and reveals word-length frequency that observers may
use to to reveal redacted text.
Figure 7.3 depicts a trend the system could exploit to merge rectangles within close prox-
imity of one another and hence eliminate this whitespace. Figure 7.4 depicts the predicate
that must evaluate to true before the system considers merging. The heuristic only accepts
whitespace left by rectangles aligned in height and position similar to text in a line.
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Figure 7.3: Horizontal distance between rectangle pairs. The x-axis is the horizontal dis-
tance in pixels between the end of one rectangle and the beginning of another, and the y-axis
is the count of how many times a particular distance appeared. This histogram includes all
screenshots from dataset 1 without any optimizations to eliminate or thin redaction rectangles
beforehand. Note that rectangle pairs comprising the far left peak could be merged horizon-
tally within their respective screenshot to eliminate inter-word whitespace. This figure only
includes whitespace accepted by the heuristic depicted in Figure 7.4.
(x, y) (x+w,  y)
(x+w,  y+h)
2h
(x’, y’)
(x’, y’+h’)
Left Rectangle Right Rectangle
Figure 7.4: Predicate used to evaluate rectangle whitespace. If (x + w) ≤ x ′, (y −
h
2 ) ≤ y′ ≤ (y + h2 ), and y + h2 ≤ (y′ + h′) ≤ y + 32 h, then the system includes
the value x ′ − (x + w) in the histogram of Figure 7.3. The system evaluates all rectangles.
7.2.2 Unsupervised Gabor-based Text Redaction
Measuring quality of text-redaction techniques requires a ground-truth dataset comprised
of screenshots with labels that mark each screenshot pixel as either text or not. Such labeled
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data can be compared to the output of a text redaction technique and the difference between
pixel labels represents error in the technique.
We lacked such ground-truth labels for our datasets and therefore proceeded down two
paths to analyze redaction.
Redaction-Analysis Path 1 First we chose a set of “best” redacted screenshots manually
using Gabor-based unsupervised redaction (see the application defined in Figure C.16) and
measured false negatives by visual inspection. Then we generated ground-truth labels for
the entire dataset manually and used all hand-picked ground truth to measure effectiveness
of Gabor-based supervised redaction.
We executed this plan for the entirety of EHR dataset 1 and followed the same procedure
for our second dataset, except that we did not measure false positives by visual inspec-
tion. Instead, we trained the supervised classifier on the first dataset and then measured its
application on the second.
We trained and tested in this order because we possessed dataset 1 for a period of time
before obtaining dataset 2. This approach reflects a “real-world” scenario where all training
variants do not exist initially. In practice, one could retrain classifiers after new datasets
have been acquired, and we could have done so in our analysis. However, we chose to
continue studying other aspects of the system and left such analysis as subject of future
work.
To choose screenshots manually for the first path, we consider 5 output classes of the
redaction process:
1. False positives are non-text pixels that have been redacted.
2. False negatives are text characters that have not been redacted. These are the worst
type of error because they may reveal sensitive information directly.
3. Partial false negative are partial text characters that have not been redacted. Depend-
ing on the extent of a revealed character, the error may not be detrimental.
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Figure 7.5: Problems labeling redacted-text by visual inspection. Many judgements apply to
labeling ground-truth pixels and during quantitative assessment of various redaction tech-
niques, such judgements may produce pixel-mismatches between ground-truth labels and
redaction output and thus introduce quantitative error. However, little or no qualitative im-
pact may exist in redaction quality. This figure demonstrates a few cases where this mismatch
could occur. “Fill regions” of bounding boxes may not precisely overlap, some letters may
remain partially uncovered, height differences among redacted regions may exist, and white
space between words or letters may exist.
4. True negatives are non-text pixels that have not been redacted. This is a desirable
output state.
5. True positives are text characters that have been redacted. This is also a desirable
output state.
True positives must include some surrounding pixels, otherwise redaction and changing
the display color of text are equivalent (assuming text is not changed to the background
color). In general, the number of surrounding pixels that should be redacted is ill-defined,
and thus qualitative judgement rather than quantitative analysis underlies a portion of “class
labeling by visual inspection.” Consequently, our “ground-truth” has subjective compo-
nents that qualitatively appear reasonable. Figure 7.5 demonstrates issues that arose during
our analysis.
Note that we differentiate between pixels and characters when examining redaction out-
put. In cases where we measured redaction output states of a redacted screenshot manually,
we counted characters. When the system performed the measurements, it counted pixels.
Additionally, we tabulated partial false negatives because partial characters are possible
results of text redaction. Because pixels are an indivisible unit, the system only measured
whole pixels.
We did not count false positives by visual inspection because they represent non-
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characters and in many cases require counting pixels to be meaningful. With over 1 million
pixels per screenshot, this proposition was beyond the scope of our efforts.
Additionally, some false positives may be non-text symbols the system should redact
conditionally, and in general, false positives do not reveal information but reduce screenshot
context. A clear method does not exist to quantify this latter effect without counting pixels.
In combination, these issues greatly complicate counting false positives manually and led
us to avoid doing so.
Redaction-Analysis Path 2 In the second analysis path, we redacted screenshots using
Gabor-based unsupervised classification with a 1 < k < 3 and chose the best redaction
manually, labeled it as ground-truth, and used that ground truth to measure Gabor-based
supervised classification.
We manually analyzed unsupervised Gabor-based text redaction on a small number of
screenshots from our first EHR dataset. As described in Section 7.1, we tabulated false
negatives and partial false negatives of text characters. For the reasons outlined there, we
did not count false positives.
Each analyzed screenshot contained between 1100 and 2000 characters and we likely
introduced a small number of human errors counting. To analyze a breadth of screenshot
content we chose a few screenshots with low pairwise similarity measures as described in
Subsection 7.2.6. Table 7.1 summarizes our findings.
7.2.3 Supervised Gabor-based Text Redaction
We trained the supervised classifier on dataset 1, which may have been fortuitous. Quali-
tatively, the dataset appears visually more complex than the dataset 2. Figure 7.6 examines
the rectangle count for each screenshot of each dataset, which supports one measure of
complexity. Figure 7.7 compares color distributions of datasets 1 and 2 and demonstrates
another.
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Total Characters
False Negatives Partial False Negatives
(Count/Fraction) (Count/Fraction)
1149 5 / .0044 22 / .0191
1102 4 / .0036 19 / .0172
1094 14 / .0128 41 / .0375
2145 58 / .0270 94 / .0438
1779 22 / .0124 58 / .0326
Table 7.1: Unsupervised Gabor-based redaction effectiveness. False negatives ranged
[.005, .03] and partial false negatives ranged from [.02, .045]. Note that we only counted false
negatives if characters were unredacted entirely. Qualitatively, some partial false negatives
revealed no more than one or two pixels of the underlying text and in other cases only a few
redaction pixels covered text.
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Figure 7.6: Sorted rectangle count of each screenshot in each dataset. The x-axis is the screen-
shot number and the y-axis is the count of redaction rectangles that exist within the screenshot.
To derive these values, an application redacts each screenshot using Canny-based redaction as
described in Section 5.2, but instead of generating and drawing bounding boxes around each
contour found in each screenshot, it simply counts them as described in Figure C.1. The first
dataset generally contains more rectangles than the second, which supports the qualitative
notion that dataset 1 is visually more complex than dataset 2.
Figure 7.8 highlights the effectiveness of supervised Gabor-based text redaction applied
to the second dataset after being trained on the first. The ground-truth labels of the second
dataset were chosen manually from a set of unsupervised Gabor-based redaction alterna-
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Figure 7.7: Normalized color variety of each dataset. The x-axes are color values and y-
axes are fraction of total pixels. Note how color variation in dataset 1 has less variation than
dataset 2. This suggests a more even color distribution in dataset 1 and supports the qualitative
notion that dataset 1 is visually more complex than dataset 2.
tives for each screenshot.
7.2.4 Layout analysis
In some circumstances, Gabor- or Canny-based redaction can hide text but leave screen
patterns that reveal sensitive information to observers. Figure 7.9 demonstrates one such
problem with a Gabor-redacted screenshot. In the example, viewers can distinguish be-
tween objects whose redacted and unredacted versions connote similar information.
In our dataset, such objects appeared within rows and columns of like objects—some
were checked and some not. Additionally, some rows and columns of text existed as in
Figure 7.10, which depicts a Canny-redacted EHR screenshot mask. Such missing row or
column elements may provide helpful information to a knowledgeable observer.
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 demonstrate layout trends the system could exploit to k-
anonymize [52] screenshots visually and reduce the aforementioned problems. In doing
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Figure 7.8: Effectiveness of Gabor-based text redaction. The x-axis is the screenshot num-
ber and the y-axis is the fraction of total classifier labels that matched ground-truth labels.
To derive these results, we trained a liblinear L1-regularized logistic regression classifier on
dataset 1 as described in Section 5.3.4 and applied it to the 29 screenshots of dataset 2. True
positive represents correctly classified text, true negative represents correctly classified non-
text, and performance is the sum of the two. False positives define non-text classified as text
and false negatives define text classified as non-text. The mean classification performance is
95.2% with a stddev of .953% and a minimum performance value of 93.2%—larger minima are
better than smaller ones. The mean false-negative rate is .307% with a stddev of .338% and a
maximum value of 1.4%—smaller maxima are better than larger ones.
so, the system would fill-in rows, columns, and normalize the state of certain objects such
as checkboxes so they all appear similar—redacted, uncheck, checked, etc. Some screen-
shots may require this level of protection, but probably not all.
7.2.5 Templates
EHR records contain visual “alerts” such as red exclamation points or yellow-highlighted
text that connote an exceptional situation to the viewer. Automatically finding alerts within
EHR records can support bulk screenshot analysis such as determining which and how
many alerts exist, whether they correspond correctly to other metadata within the record
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Figure 7.9: Leaking checkbox state with redaction. The screenshot depicts a plain screenshot
and its Gabor-redacted counterpart. Toggled checkboxes are distinguishable in the redacted
version and the problem could be addressed by “normalizing” the column so that each box
appears identical.
set, etc. To demonstrate how our system can support such analysis, Figure 7.13 depicts the
counts of 18 unique alerts chosen from the 51 screenshots of dataset 1.
Red Pixel Analysis
Professionals in the healthcare field presented the idea that alerts contain red pixels, and so
we hypothesized that by examining histograms of red screenshot pixels, one could discover
the existence and location of alerts withing a screenshot. Figure 7.14 summarizes our
findings.
7.2.6 Text-Redaction and Screenshot Context
Visual similarities between a screenshot and its redacted version or differences between two
redacted screenshots enable observers to recognize captured application windows despite
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Missing rows
Varying row widths
Figure 7.10: Leaking information with visual structure. The figure depicts a Canny-redacted
EHR screenshot mask. Some columns have missing rows and others have rows of varying
widths. Depending on the screenshot and column position, these variations may provide useful
information to a knowledgeable observer. The problem could be addressed by “normalizing”
the columns so that each row and column appear identical; elements can be filled in where
needed and drawn to the same widths.
the presence of text redaction. Such useful context is a source of differentiating “informa-
tion” that observers unconsciously exploit to distinguish screenshots from one another and
recognize them in the first place.
We assert that such differentiating information or “screenshot context” is important to
maintain when redacting text because it may provide useful metadata to knowledgeable
observers. Thus, our system does not blindly redact entire screenshots and leave the end-
user to unredact a majority of context (in addition to any other screenshot features they wish
to unredact). The left-hand screenshot of Figure 7.1 depicts such a full-screen redaction.
We devised a metric to quantify the “information” that exists among screenshot pairs,
and the application listed in Figure C.2 computes the value. The application computes the
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180 px
40 py
Figure 7.11: A marked-up redaction mask using Canny-based text redaction. This figure
depicts a Canny-based redaction mask with a layout grid. The underlying screenshot is an
EHR screenshot taken from dataset 1, and black horizontal and vertical lines were drawn
every 20 pixels starting in the upper left corner. We outlined a column of redaction rectangles
at pixel x ≈ 180 and a row or redaction rectangles at pixel y ≈ 40. These values can be found
empirically using the measurements depicted by Figure 7.12. Note that the markup described
here is not limited to Canny-based redaction.
fraction of overlapping text-redacted pixels in an image pair. This measure constitutes the
amount of differentiating “information” reduced by text redaction, and a smaller value is
better because it means that text redaction has reduced less, potentially useful screenshot
context.
The application begins computing in the upper-left corner of each screenshot and cal-
culates from left to right over each row before analyzing the next row. Calculations are
not made for pixel addresses of one screenshot that lie outside of the other because no pair
exists.
The application accumulates changes when it text redacts pairwise-pixel values S(x, y)
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Figure 7.12: Analyzing redaction layout of an EHR screenshot. We analyzed the EHR screen-
shot that underlies Figure 7.11 to derive the histograms depicted here. From the top down, the
first and second histograms depict the fraction of black redaction pixels that exist at partic-
ular x and y coordinates respectively. The third and fourth histograms depict the fraction of
redaction rectangles that exist at particular x and y coordinates respectively, considering only
the upper-left corner of each rectangle. The first and third arrows correspond to the column
outlined at pixel x ≈ 180 in Figure 7.11, and the second and fourth arrows correspond to the
row outlined at pixel y ≈ 40. Minor x-tics in each plot are spaced every 20-pixels, and the
upper-left corner of Figure 7.11 is (0, 0).
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Figure 7.13: Alert template matches in EHR dataset 1. The x-axis depicts the alert number
and the axis the total count. We hand-picked alerts from a small number of screenshots in
dataset 1 using five in one tool to save templates (see Figure 6.8 for details about saving tem-
plates). Then we fed the file to count matching templates depicted in Figure C.5 to count the
total number of templates that exist in dataset 1.
and S′(x, y) of screenshots S and S′ in pair (S, S′) with the redaction operation R(p). The
following equation defines how the application counts the total number of pairwise changes
induced by text redaction:
total changes =
∑
x,y

1 x ∈ S ∧ x ∈ S′ ∧ y ∈ S ∧ y ∈ S′
∧ (S(x, y) 6= 0 ∨ S′(x, y) 6= 0)
∧ (R(S′(x, y)) = 0 ∧ R(S′(x, y)) = 0) ,
0 otherwise
Changes accumulate only when a pair of pixels exist, at least one pixel of the pair begins
non-black, and both pixels are redacted.
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Figure 7.14: Red color values of four separate EHR screenshots. Each x-axis depicts the value
and each y-axis depicts the fraction of screenshot pixels that possessed a given red channel
value. We analyzed red-pixel histograms of four screenshots from dataset 1 and found no ob-
vious trend that suggests red-pixel count can reveal whether an alert exists within a screenshot
or not. Upon visual inspection, we found that alerts contained varying numbers and shades
of red pixels, and non-alert regions of some screenshots (including text regions) contained
red pixels. In one instance, text was written in rows with alternating dark- and light-pink
backgrounds, which are comprised of red pixel values. The first screenshot had one alert, the
second pink rows, and the final two, many alerts. Our findings do not preclude more complex
signal processing from discovering alerts based on red pixel counts.
Next the application computes the pairwise fraction for screenshot pair (S, S′) as
total changes/total pixels,
where
total pixels = max width×max height (7.1)
of both screenshots of the pair.
When one or both pixels begin non-black and the pixels correspond to text, redaction
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removes differentiating information by converting both values to black. Removing infor-
mation reduces differentiating screenshot context. Taken to the limit, redaction blackens
each screenshot entirely and leaves no differentiating information. Except for size and
metadata unrelated to pixel values, screenshot context disappears in this case.
Figure 7.15 depicts the effect of redaction on image pairs and Figure 7.16 depicts the
number of matching black pixels within each screenshot pair (S, S′) before redaction is
applied.
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Figure 7.15: Redaction effect on image information. These figures depict the effect of redac-
tion on screenshot pairs from dataset 1. The x-axis of both plots is a pair identifier and both
y-axes are the fraction text-redacted pixels the images have in common. The top figure depicts
all image pairs in dataset 1, including those with identical screenshots. The bottom figure
depicts pairs where screenshots are paired with themselves. Pairing an image with itself com-
putes the effect of redaction on a single image. For all pairs, the mean fraction of overlapping,
redacted text is 0.093 with a stddev of 0.035, and for pairs of identical screenshots, the mean
is 0.237 with a stddev of 0.036. Redaction preserves 90% of differentiating information in all
pairs and 76% in pairs of identical screenshots—on average, redaction affects no more than
24% of the pixels in any screenshot. Based on the maximum value plotted, the system redacts
no more than 35% of any screenshot in dataset 1. Thus, the system preservers a large fraction
of potentially useful screenshot context.
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Figure 7.16: Fraction of black-pixels within screenshot pairs. This figure depicts screenshot
pairs from dataset 1, excluding pairs where pair elements are identical screenshots. The x-axis
is a pair identifier (which does not correlate to the x-axis in Figure 7.15) and the y-axis is the
fraction of pixel pairs where both pixels in the pair share a black value. As Figure 7.15 demon-
strates the effects of redaction, only pairs of black pixels are left unaffected by redaction—they
are already black. Within dataset 1, a small number of black pixels exist at the same location
in different screenshots. 151 screenshot pairs have no overlapping black pixels.
Pairwise-Screenshot Similarity
In another technique the system computes a “distance” between two screenshots by count-
ing the number of pixels that match within the pair. As above, counting begins in the upper
left of each screenshot and moves across columns before moving to the next row. However,
all non-overlapping pixel values (due to a screenshot-size mismatch) count as differences
and reduce similarity. The total pixel count is identical to equation 7.1, and the fraction of
matching pixels within a pair is defined as the following:
similar count/total pixels.
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The application listed in Figure C.3 computes this distance and Figure 7.17 depicts how
text redaction does not completely eliminate pairwise differences.
Because EHR screenshots are nearly identical in size and aligned in content, e.g., items
such as menus are not pixel-shifted among screenshots, this measurement gives a notion of
similarity that enables useful pairwise-screenshot comparisons. We qualitatively validated
our technique visually; screenshots that matched (or not) with a large fraction of pixels
according to the metric were visually comparable (or not).
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Figure 7.17: Effect of text redaction on pairwise screenshot similarity. We computed the
effect of text redaction over 1275 screenshot pairs of dataset 1 (we excluded pairs of identical
screenshots). The x-axis of both plots is the screenshot pair identifier. The top plot depicts the
change in pixel similarity among pairwise images after redaction, and the bottom plot displays
the fraction of identical pixels among image pairs, both before and after redaction. In the top
plot, fractions that fall above the horizontal line correspond to screenshots that are more
similar and those below the line correspond to screenshots that are less similar. The latter
case occurs when pixels that matched before text redaction do not match afterwards. Overall,
redaction has little impact on pairwise screenshot similarity with changes ranging from 2 −
15%. Text-redaction retains potentially important screenshot context in EHR dataset 1.
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7.3 Processing Latency
The principal computational components of our system include text redaction and template
matching, and we empirically quantify their latency characteristics in this section.
A MacBook Pro running Mac OS X 10.7 with 8 GB of memory serves as the experi-
mental platform. An AES-256-encrypted disk image stores image, feature, and label files
associated with redaction. See Appendix B for more information about these files. All file
loads are measured using a cold file cache; remounting the encrypted storage volume be-
fore each set of file-access sensitive measurements flushes buffers and ensures a consistent,
cold cache. The dtrace [50] tool generates some measurements and test applications gen-
erate others by programmatically printing timing information to the screen (C.6,C.9, C.10,
C.18, C.19, C.20).
7.3.1 Text Redaction
We analyzed numerous aspects of the computational latencies associated with text redac-
tion. We ran computations against all images in dataset 1 to derived measurements, and
for each data point we compute a mean, standard deviation, and standard deviation / mean.
The last value provides a “normalized” notion of variability with respect to the mean.
Table 7.2 compares the cost of Canny-, supervised Gabor-, and unsupervised Gabor-
based text redaction, Table 7.3 describes latencies required to generate Gabor features and
labels, and finally, Table 7.4 describes latencies to load Gabor features and labels from disk.
7.3.2 Template Matching
Finally, we analyzed the computational cost of matching templates against a screenshot.
First the system compares a template against all pixels in an image and then it searches
through comparison results to find matches. Figure 7.18 depicts the latency of comparison
operations and Figure 7.19 depicts the latency of searching through results to find template
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Redaction Type
Mean Latency stddev stddev / Mean
(seconds) (seconds)
Canny 0.096732016 0.009194057 0.095047
Unsupervised Gabor 2.077065258 0.722214985 0.347709
Supervised Gabor 2.077105231 0.016699164 0.008040
Table 7.2: Latency to classify pixels for redaction. All measurements include the time required
to build a redaction mask used by the system to paint a redacted image. For Canny, we
measured the time required to find redaction rectangles within an image, construct bounding
boxes, and add this information to a list. For unsupervised Gabor, we measured the time
required to segment Gabor features using kmeans classification and build a redaction mask
used to paint a redacted image. For supervised Gabor, we measured the time required to
classify each pixel as “text” or “not text.”
Operation
Mean Latency stddev stddev / Mean
(seconds) (seconds)
Setup 0.364528181 0.004057357 0.011130
Build 13.114747233 0.180450313 0.013759
Normalize 4.568932003 0.033349181 0.007299
Table 7.3: Latency to generate Gabor elements. We measure the time to setup all 28 filters,
build feature vectors, and normalize their values. Filtering the image, applying a threshold
transform, computing features, and setting up a data structure comprise “building” feature
vectors. Subsection 5.3.1 describes Gabor-based text redaction in detail.
Operation
Mean Latency stddev stddev / Mean
(seconds) (seconds)
Features 5.986632176 0.406650891 0.067926
Labels 0.226349412 0.068724034 0.303619
Table 7.4: Latency to load Gabor elements from a file on disk. After generating Gabor fea-
tures, our system can store them persistently to disk. The first row lists the latency of loading
Gabor features from disk, which includes both features and their vector coordinates as de-
scribed in Section B.1. The second row lists the latency of loading feature labels from disk.
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Figure 7.18: Latency of matching varying template sizes. The x-axis is the side length of a
template (note the log scale). The y-axis of the top plot is the mean time in seconds required
to match a template against an entire image. The y-axis of the bottom plot is the stddev of the
latency in the top plot as a fraction of the mean. Each point is computed over all images in
dataset 1. Note that a few images vary in size by 2 pixels in height, which does not significantly
impact these calculations. See Section B.2 for information about the datasets.
matches. We computed figures with square templates of varying sizes and side lengths in
pixels that were powers of two.
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Figure 7.19: Latency of searching for results of a template match. The x-axis is the side length
of a template (note the log scale). The y-axis of the top plot is the mean time in seconds required
to search through the results of a template match operation. The y-axis of the bottom plot is
the stddev of the latency in the top plot as a fraction of the mean. Each point is computed over
all images in dataset 1. Note that a few images vary in size by 2 pixels in height, which does
not significantly impact these calculations. See Section B.2 for information about the datasets.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
To improve the ability of our system to redact correctly and with reasonable performance,
we first need to understand its performance envelope and strengths and weaknesses. In the
last chapter, we described empirical aspects of image analysis and computational latencies
that begin to provide insight into these issues. In this chapter, we discuss the empirical
measurements provided in Chapter 7 and how one might exploit them to improve system
performance.
Section 8.1 discusses Canny- and Gabor-based text redaction and layout of redacted
text, Section 8.2 discusses image templates and alert matching, and Section 8.3 closes the
chapter with a brief discussion on overall computational latency.
8.1 Text Redaction
In this dissertation we describe three text-redaction techniques: Canny, unsupervised Ga-
bor, and supervised Gabor. According to Table 7.2, Canny performs over 20× faster than
either Gabor-based technique, but evidence in the same chapter suggests that it requires
tuning before it can be used use in a “real-world” system.
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8.1.1 Canny
Subsection 7.2.1 describes how Canny generates as many as four times more redaction
rectangles than necessary, which can slow subsequent processing steps that touch every
rectangle. Figure 7.1 describes how Canny generates redaction rectangles that cover the
entire screen, which reduces non-private visual context for observers. Figure 7.3 describes
how Canny leaves whitespace between words, which may enable word-based frequency
analysis that reveals redacted text. Finally, the introduction of Canny in Section 5.2 and
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate these problems and their tendency to miss some text (false
negatives) while redacting some non-text (false positives). False positives and negatives
can create more work for the end-user relying on our system to prepare a screenshot for
sharing. At the potential cost of additional processing, we demonstrated trends that could
be exploited to reduce many of Canny-related problems.
Large Canny rectangles that include non-private data can reduce an observers screenshot
context. To handle this problem (described fully in Figure 7.1), the system could exploit
the trends show in Figure 7.2 to eliminate large redaction rectangles that fall within certain
analytical bounds. The system could eliminate large rectangles that wholly contain a large
fraction of others and larger rectangles whose pairwise area ratio is near zero.
Reducing rectangle count can reduce the latency of subsequent processing steps that
involve all Canny rectangles, such as rendering rectangles in an image or analyzing and
merging adjacent words. In Figure 6.14, the five in one tool demonstrates a technique to
reduce superfluous rectangles by merging rectangles where one wholly contains another.
In that sample screenshot, the merging technique reduced the count of redaction rectangles
by 4-fold (at the cost of an additional processing step). Before merging, all-inclusive, large
rectangles should be reduced using the trends depicted in Figure 7.2.
In combination, exploiting word length, ordering of word length, and contextual topic,
e.g., medicine or any number of subtopics, may enable frequency analysis and reduce pri-
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vacy of redacted text. Merging adjacent words could reduce this problem.1 The system
can merge rectangles horizontally with inter-word spaces that fall within certain analytical
bounds by exploiting the trend depicted in Figure 7.3.
8.1.2 Gabor
Unlike Canny, we empirically assessed the ability of Gabor to redact text pixels correctly;
Canny required additional fine-tuning before we could meaningfully assess the technique
(see Figure 7.1 for an example of a Canny failure). We found no ground-truth datasets of
screenshots that label pixels either text or non-text. Thus we began by visually inspect-
ing and analyzing false negative and partial false negative rates of unsupervised Gabor
redaction as described in Subsection 7.2.2. We built on this assessment by hand-picking
ground-truth for all images of dataset 1 and 2 using unsupervised Gabor redaction. Then we
split this ground-truth dataset to serve as a train- and test- set for supervised Gabor redac-
tion. According to the measurements of redaction effectiveness described in Table 7.1 and
Figure 7.8, each form of the Gabor approach performs well.
We trained the supervised Gabor classifier on dataset 1 because we possessed it before
dataset 2. As demonstrated by the performance of of the classifier trained on dataset 1 and
tested on dataset 2, this ordering produced a classification accuracy of greater than 90%
(see Figure 7.8). Rather than run a battery of experiments such as swapping the testing
and training sets or mix the two datasets before testing and training, we chose to continue
with other experiments. However, we hypothesized that greater visual complexity present
in dataset 1 led to the high classification results of dataset 2. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 attempt to
capture empirically how datasets vary from one another in visual complexity. In dataset 1,
the number of image features found using Canny and the smooth color gradation suggest,
for some notion of “visual complexity,” that dataset 1 has more visual complexity than
1Additionally, an attacker may have external knowledge about particular redacted words and use that
information to simplify their frequency analysis problem using such ground-truth.
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dataset 2.
As demonstrated by Figure 5.3, Gabor-based text redaction leaves much less whitespace
between words and appears to target text well. Additionally, supervised Gabor guarantees
a pixel label of “text” or “not-text” independent of image content and end-user involvement
at a one-time training cost. As described in Subsection 5.3.3, unsupervised Gabor requires
an end-user to choose a suitable “k” and “i” for each classified image.
In combination with the supervised and unsupervised latencies outlined in Section 7.22,
supervised Gabor appears to be the suitable technique for performing text redaction. How-
ever, both under-perform Canny latency by 20×, without including the costs to generate or
load Gabor features depicted by Tables 7.3 and 7.4. After perfecting its accuracy, Canny
may be the technique we employ by default.
Additionally, both supervised and unsupervised Gabor require the system to generate
feature pixels before classifying. Compare Tables 7.3 and 7.4 to see that recomputing
features is more expensive than storing and reloading from disk, even when feature files
and labels are stored in a software-encrypted disk image on a laptop disk. Generating
Gabor features requires multiple, computational-intensive steps for each Gabor filter in the
employed filterbank and therefore requires the most time of any Gabor-precessing step.
8.1.3 Redaction Layout
Visual objects such as checkboxes, column and row structure, and varying field widths
embody screenshot content that may be invariant to the effects of text redaction. See Fig-
ures 7.9 and 7.10 for examples. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 demonstrate trends the system could
exploit to “normalize” such invariant content by making row and column entries even in
count and width. By examining pixel and rectangle layouts, the system can determine
where rows and columns exist and their visual characteristics, such as length and height.
2Mean latencies of supervised versus unsupervised Gabor are approximately equivalent but the standard
deviation of unsupervised Gabor is much higher.
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Together, this visual metadata could underlie a process that visually k-anonymizes screen-
shots.
8.2 Templates
Template-matching allows the system to unredact user-defined regions of the screen (Fig-
ures 6.3, 6.8, and 6.9); count alerts (Figure 7.13); and perform other predicate-based op-
erations automatically (i.e., if a screen matches a template, perform action x). OpenCV
implements the matching method as described in SubsectionA.2.2.
Figure 7.18 depicts performance measurements of the system’s ability to match tem-
plates. The two-step matching operation can be expensive when tens or hundreds of tem-
plates per screenshot must be matched. To perform a match, the system compares a small
patch of template pixels against a target image and fills a matrix with comparison results.
Then, the system searches the result matrix for matches. Searching can be two orders of
magnitude less expensive than matching 7.19. Overall, the performance of template match-
ing is proportional to image size , depth, and target size, and the system could downsample
both template and target to improve the matching rate.
8.2.1 Matching Alerts
One important aspect of template matching is counting matches or taking action when the
system finds one or more matches. To avoid costly template matches and empirically cor-
roborate a notion that alerts contain red pixels, we measured red image pixels. Figure 7.14
demonstrates our findings on four images that contain alerts and no immediate trends were
prevalent. Red pixels of varying shades and volume exist in screenshot regions that do not
contain alert images. Further experimentation may lead to useful results. For example, the
system could search for red-valued pixels only within Canny rectangles and cross-correlate
findings to discover useful patterns.
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8.3 Overall Computational Latency
Redacting screenshots at the rate of full-motion video, 30 frames-per-second or 0.03¯
seconds-per-frame, would ensure smooth operation of scrubs-based deployments or server-
based configurations where the system bulk-processes a collection of screenshots to redact
text or match templates. However, none of the described processing techniques operate at
this rate yet. Despite this fact, we have discussed how the system can provide text-redacted
captures at human interaction rates (scrubs) and in static form (Gabor-based redaction and
five in one).
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Chapter 9
Future Work
In past chapters, we described many technical aspects of our proof-of-concept sys-
tem (Chapters 3–6), empirical measurements of its performance characteristics (Chapter 7),
and how one might exploit findings to improve performance (Chapter 8). In this chapter,
we consider future work. We begin by reviewing the “big-picture” of our system in Sec-
tion 9.1 and then share directions for “big-picture” work in Section 9.2. Finally, we close
the chapter with directions for smaller technical details in Section 9.3.
9.1 Big-Picture Review
Recall Section 1.3, where we described how screen capture for sensitive systems could
help improve overall system security. In the example scenario, hospital EHR software
impeded clinician workflow and thus may have negatively affected the security of patient
data records and physical well-being of patients. A security researcher working together
with a hospital administrator wished to study the impact of the technology on clinician
workflow in the hospital setting.
Our work provided a technical mechanism that, together with components described in
Figure 3.1, systematized data collection and protection, simplified the process of under-
standing system problems empirically, and facilitated rich communications with develop-
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ers. With a simplified and systematized process, many other studies could be carried out
quickly and efficiently to tune EHR systems and improve their overall usability and secu-
rity.
9.2 Big-Picture Directions
Implement the Vision To fulfill the vision described in Figure 3.1, we can implement the
sharing components. The system currently implements screen capture and text redaction
but does not include system components to share data.
Command-line Interpreter and Rich User Interface The system currently relies on
keystrokes and a limited user interface (UI) to interact with and manipulate screenshot
imagery and video. We would like to improve the UI by incorporating menus and OS-
native versions of edit systems. Additionally, the edit and analysis applications could be
combined with a command-line front-end to expedite our development and analysis of the
system.
Complete Web Front-End In an alternative approach for end-users, the sharing system,
screenshot viewer, and screenshot editor could all be web-based, platform independent, and
centrally managed. A web-enabled system could enable real-time visualization, sharing of
links among end-users, and downloading material to local formats, etc.
One obvious downside to this arrangement may be that unfettered access to a central
redaction system could provide access to screenshots before final edits have been imple-
mented. Another issue may be managing access control to web-accessible material.1
Remote Management In some cases, it may be useful to allow authenticated capture
controls through a smartphone or web browser. Actions such as “start” or “stop capture”
1“Web-accessible” may not equate to “Internet-accessible.” Data may be accessible via an organization-
internal network or any other number of arrangements.
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and “publish redacted screenshots” could exist as simple commands accessible via those
means.
Camera-based Image Upload Supporting input from ad hoc sources may further im-
prove an end-users ability to capture important information in a timely fashion. End-users
could collect screenshots with a camera mounted on a mobile device and upload data se-
curely to a network-accessible system interface.
User studies Ultimately, we hope our system improves data-driven communications
among application stakeholders such as end-users, developers, administrators, and policy-
makers. To test how well the system achieves this goal, we should run user studies. We
would like to understand how end-users use the capture system, how the system performs
in their environment, which application features are useful and which are not, how end-
users include the instrumentation in a concept of operations, how much unredacted context
provides value, and many other issues. Healthcare is one domain that could benefit largely
from this work and can serve as a proving ground to tune the existing system and guide
evolution of its feature set.
Predicate Matching Predicate matching is an important building block of a pro-
grammable system that responds differently to varied inputs. In future work, we plan to
implement support for predicate matching to allow programs to be built on top of the ba-
sic image processing capabilities provided by our system. For example, a predicate might
say “if rectangle x matches in the upper left corner of the screen, then perform action y.”
Predicate matching is closely related to OCR and language-driven operations described
next.
Include Optical Character Recognition (OCR) To support higher-level semantic op-
erations such as predicate matching, we should include OCR in a future version of the
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system. Such processing would also enable the use of natural language processing (NLP)
to selectively remove sensitive text from screenshots (Chapter 2).
Policy-based Operations Currently, the capture system redacts text blindly using a
default-deny policy (Section 5.1). In future work, we could explore the combination of
predicate matching, OCR, and a processing language to intelligently redact regions of the
screen or perform other operations. The system could search for and count alerts, cross-
correlate accuracy of screenshot content without access to the underlying application pro-
gramming interface.
Screen rewriting With the ability to recognize regions of the screen and perform
predicate-driven actions based on content, our system could be used to rewrite the screen in
real-time to fine-tune the end-user experience. This work could build on existing research
in universal access for disadvantaged users (e.g., [31]).
Motion Analytics We would like to apply analytics to understand mouse and navigation
motions in a capture video. Such quantitative findings could inform application stakehold-
ers how an application is used in practice and influence future improvements.
User Notes As users customize redacted screenshots, they may wish to include textual
notations, circles, arrows, and other basic markups to highlight points. The system cur-
rently does not support these but can in a future version of the system.
Secured Captures Because many existing image viewers do not support encrypted im-
age data, the current system does implement cryptographic protections on images. How-
ever, some users may wish to secure images cryptographically with integrity, confidential-
ity, non-repudiation, or some other properties. Therefore, a future version of the system
can include cryptographic protections, perhaps as “metadata” carried in common image
file formats.
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In theory, protections such as valid image signatures can represent authentic provenance,
image content, and “trustworthy” redaction operations, but many subtle security details
would remain to be considered. For example, many security problems can arise when
signed and viewed data differ or images contain active content [35].
Metadata Watermarks Certain metadata can be watermarked directly into the image.
Coupled with cryptographic integrity protections, such information can help form an audit
trail related to a capture.
Updating a Redacted Image The system could include secured metadata with each im-
age to enable unredact operations of existing redacted text. Password protection or another
form of encrypted protection could be used to manage metadata access control.
Anonymized Identifiers Instead of fully redacting text, the system could match and re-
place it with anonymous identifiers in a way that preserves correlation but deidentifies
individuals.
As an example, suppose a system captures login screens and a researcher wishes to study
login access patterns without associating a particular pattern with a specific person. Each
username could be remapped to an identifier that replaces the actual username in captured
login screen with a consistent but anonymous identifier. The researcher could then correlate
login screens without gaining user identity.
9.3 Lower-level Issues
Redaction Canny-based redaction clearly outperforms Gabor in computational perfor-
mance (Table 7.2), but it requires tuning before the technique can be practically useful.
We presented a number of promising avenues for future work. The processing steps in Fig-
ure 9.1 collect a number of them into a coherent processing chain and include a new, Gabor-
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Figure 9.1: Future information flow using Canny-based redaction. Revisiting Figure 3.3 we
expand the redaction step to incorporate material from Chapters 7 and 8. In that step, the
system would first filter out large rectangles to avoid fully-redacted screens (Subsection 8.1.1).
Then, it would reduce significantly the number of rectangles managed during the redaction
processing by merging redacted rectangles (Subsection 8.1.1). Next the system would apply
supervised Gabor redaction over a random sampling of pixels from each redaction rectangle
to eliminate false-positives—a lack of Gabor-detected text would induce the system to discard
the redaction rectangle. After this, it would merge whitespace (Section 8.1), and finally, system
could visually k-anonymize rows, columns, and objects such as checkboxes (Subsection 8.1.3).
based step worth further investigation. We can apply supervised Gabor-based text redaction
after thinning superfluous rectangles to eliminate Canny-based false-positives such as the
one demonstrated in Figure 5.1. As a result, we may be able to increase Canny’s sensitivity
threshold to redact lower-contrast text while maintaining a low false positive rate.
Remote Monitoring In this work the VNC protocol established a remote monitoring
connection to a target workstation (Section 4.2). In future work, the system could secure
the connection using encryption and authentication via the TLS [26] or SSH [69] protocols,
support compression of transported screenshots, support hardware-based KVM systems,
and implement a Citrix-based [19] connection protocol to monitor remote systems.
Metadata and Revision Control Aside from Gabor features and labels, the current sys-
tem does not store a comprehensive set of metadata such as Canny-based redaction rectan-
gles with each image. In a future area of work, the system could maintain such metadata
along with revision control to support undo and redo operations. Additionally, the system
could manage file saving intelligently. For example, certain existing applications write files
to default file names and leave renaming to the user. Altogether, these features would have
been useful during our development process.
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Training the Supervised Classifier In this work, we trained on dataset 1 and tested on
dataset 2. We can explore the classification performance of a different order or training and
testing mixtures that includes some features and labels from each dataset. Additionally, we
can establish a process to retrain and incorporate new datasets as they become available.
Building a Ground-truth Dataset The current technique of visually counting characters
to produce a basic level of ground-truth is manually intensive and counts characters instead
of pixels. We could use five in one and libraries of templates to help automate the process
of labeling ground-truth. Canny and template matching can label large fractions of each
image automatically and leave a small number of remaining elements to label by hand.
Marked pixels can be saved persistently as ground-truth text-labels and incorporated into
other processing steps. Additionally, unsupervised Gabor-based redaction can be used to
“accept” true-positives suggested by Canny.
Document Analysis and k-anonymity We introduced a foray into visual k-anonymity
founded on document analysis concepts (Subsection 8.1.3). Building a screenshot model,
such as the object model a web browser does for web documents, and using it to recognize
and k-anonymize visual structure may further reduce the workload required by an end-user
to share screenshots with application stakeholders.
Tune Gabor Currently, Gabor parameters are tuned heuristically by starting with a pa-
rameter set that worked for others and hand-tuning variables until the system provides
“useful” results. To improve rigor, we can explore works that describe design of Gabor
filter banks [27, 65].
Replace Gabor The concept of steerable filters developed by Freeman and Adelson [29]
could reduce the computational load associated with Gabor filtering by reducing the filter-
bank size. Two steerable filters can replace four Gabor orientations and therefore reduce
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the overall filterbank size by one half.
Replace Canny Jensen-Shannon divergence may be a simple, high speed alternative to
our use of Canny [14, 15]. The technique finds image contours.
Template Matching Currently, the system matches a template against a full resolution
screenshot. Instead we could down-sample the template and screenshot multiple times,
match at low resolutions, and rematch at higher resolutions only where low resolution
matches exist. This may reduce matching time, albeit down-sampling includes a filter
application which could reduce its computational benefit.
Color Analysis We can study the effect of screenshot color shades on redaction effec-
tiveness. End-users of applications such as EHR systems have the ability to change color
schemes, and color schemes of such systems can vary widely among different vendors.
Both of these factors can affect redaction algorithms. For example, our Canny technique
relies on an image intensity gradient to detect edges within an image. The Canny algorithm
will not detect text with low tonal variation compared to its background.
A parallel output of this work may be color-palette guidance for developers to maximize
the effectiveness of text redaction.
Finding Alerts We used template matching to find alerts within images and explored
red-pixel histograms to search for screenshot alerts without relying on expensive template
matching (Subsection 8.2.1). We found no immediate trends. In a next step, we could
examine red histograms in redacted text only and eliminate less “interesting” screen regions
that may contain red pixels.
In another approach, the system could find redaction rectangles, paint the entire screen
white except for the red pixels found within redaction rectangles, and analyze the remaining
spatial structure.
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“Live” Analytics Analysis tools could include plots and statistics that update in real-time
based on editor state and user actions. Chapter 7 includes analytics that may be relevant. A
“real-time” display of information such as layout or color histograms would expedite our
task in developing the system and assist end-users as they fine-tune redacted screenshots.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
We have designed, built, described, and empirically analyzed a system that allows end-users
to take screen captures on sensitive systems. The system automatically redacts screenshot
text and allows end-users to fine-tune redacted results for their needs. The automated redac-
tion process requires no end-user intervention.
To redact, our system implements three different techniques. The first is based on the
Canny edge detection algorithm that finds and marks changes in the screenshot intensity
gradients as edges. Because screenshot text exists with an intensity difference compared
to its background, Canny detects text. Before this technique can be used by our system,
it requires perfecting to reduce false-positive rectangles that include the entire screen. In
our experiments, Canny performs 20× faster than the following two redaction approaches
without counting setup time of the other techniques.
The second technique is based an unsupervised Gabor-filter technique. In this technique,
we treat text as a texture and apply a Gabor filter bank of 28 filters to generate a feature
vector for each pixel. A kmeans classifier then segments the feature list into k classes, one
of which may be text. This technique requires human intervention to choose k for each
image and then the i th of k classes that correspond to redacted text.
In the third redaction technique, the system uses a supervised Gabor-filter technique. We
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use unsupervised Gabor to generate hand-chosen ground-truth and rely on ground-truth to
train a supervised, SVM classifier. The supervised classifier always labels pixels as text or
not.
We performed the majority of our redaction experiments using 80 screenshots from elec-
tronic health record systems. Two large medical facilities provided the data.
We analyzed numerous aspects of the system to understand its performance envelope
and strengths and weaknesses. Supervised Gabor performed with with greater than 90%
accuracy and preserved 76% of image pixels on average. Thus, our text redaction scheme
preserves screenshot context.
We highlighted trends that the system could exploit to reduce or eliminate problems
experienced with Canny-based text redaction among other issues. Some trends included
rectangle area ratios, the fraction of total screenshot rectangles that a particular rectangle
contains, rectangle layout, and inter-word whitespace.
We presented a number of avenues of future work that can build on this research. We
hope to improve Canny for general-purpose use, implement predicate matching to process
screenshots according to logical conditions, build a larger ground-truth data corpus, build
system components for sharing redacted screenshots, deploy the system in a real user envi-
ronment, and study its effectiveness in improving end-user interactions with technology.
Ultimately, our redaction system can facilitate data-driven communications among appli-
cation stakeholders and guide system evolution to address stakeholder needs. With accurate
and timely tuning enabled by our work, stakeholders can achieve and maintain usable and
secure systems in practice.
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Appendix A
Supporting Libraries
This work relies on a number of external libraries developed and maintained by various
open source communities. Here we provide background for some of the more important
ones so the reader who may be unfamiliar with them can better understand discussion
throughout this dissertation.
We rely on the C++ template libraries boost [54], which is community developed and
maintained, and standard template library (STL) defined in the C++ specification [2];
OpenCV, a feature-rich open-source computer vision library originally developed by Intel
and now community developed and maintained [16]; liblinear, a machine learning library
for support vector machines (SVM) developed and maintained by National Taiwan Univer-
sity [28]; and CGAL, a computational geometry library used to efficiently find intersections
among rectangles [1, 37, 70]. CGAL is a compilation of contributions from numerous re-
searchers across the field of computational geometry study and community maintained.
A.1 boost and STL
Our work relies heavily on C++ for its implementation. It uses STL containers such as
“vector”s for storing instantiated class objects and the boost “shared ptr” to manage heap-
allocated objects. The “shared ptr” also reduces overhead associated with storing C++
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objects within STL containers. Figure A.1 demonstrates the common idiom in use.
1 c l a s s Foo {
2 . . .
3 i n t some foo method ( void ) ;
4 } ;
5
6 t y p e d e f s h a r e d p t r<Foo> f o o p t r ;
7 . . .
8 v e c t o r<f o o p t r> v ;
9 v . p u s h b a c k ( f o o p t r ( new Foo ( ) ) ) ;
10 i n t x = v . back ()−> some foo method ( ) ;
11 . . .
Figure A.1: Using a shared ptr with an STL container. This code snippet demonstrates how
shared ptr<Foo> objects are stored in an STL vector and accessed as if they were pointers
to class Foo. Note that shared ptr implements an “T* operator->(),” as demonstrated in line
10, so that accessing the object held by a shared ptr is analogous to accessing the underlying
object directly.
The shared ptr class maintains a reference count to its underlying heap-allocated mem-
ory object and when the reference count drops to 0, it calls the “delete” operator on its man-
aged object. This approach simplifies greatly the need to manually manage heap-allocated
memory.
Additionally, STL containers that store “shared ptr”s can function with greater efficiency
that those that store objects directly. Data structure operations such as insert invoke a
simple “shared ptr” copy constructor versus a potentially expensive copy constructor for a
complex C++ class.
A.2 OpenCV
The OpenCV library is a mature, popular, system-independent, open-source computer vi-
sion library implemented in a mix of C and C++. It exposes bindings for both languages
and the python [23] scripting language; we relied principally on the C++ bindings. The
library contains a rich set of documentation and examples.
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OpenCV can rely on system-native, low-level graphics routines for rendering and graph-
ics operations. For example, on our OS X development platform, OpenCV relies on Quick-
time [12] and core animation components [10] to perform low-level graphics operations.
Our system relies on OpenCV’s core, image processing, user-interface, and machine
learning components throughout. They components provide functionality that underlie
redaction and the machinery for defining redaction templates as described in Chapter 5.
They enable our system to load, store, filter, and otherwise process images; manipulate
pixels individually; draw into images; display them on a screen and handle mouse and key-
board input events; and execute the kmeans machine-learning algorithm also described in
Chapter 5.
A.2.1 Matrices
OpenCV relies on a structure called “Mat” to represent images in memory. Conceptually,
“Mat” is a matrix and OpenCV processing algorithms operate on it to manipulate images.
At various places throughout our system we store “Mat” structures in files for later pro-
cessing. Figure A.2 defines the file layout that we defined for the objects.
-------------------------------------------------
| rows | cols | step | type | (rows*step) bytes |
-------------------------------------------------
| <------- header --------> | <----- data ----> |
-------------------------------------------------
Figure A.2: OpenCV-matrix file layout. Each matrix of stored data, whether features, feature
coordinates, or feature labels, is stored as depicted in this figure. Each header field is an un-
signed 4-byte integer. “rows” is the number of rows in the matrix, “cols” is the columns, step
is the number of bytes stored per row and may be larger than cols to improve data alignment,
and type is an OpenCV matrix type ∈ {CV U8C1,CV F32C1}OpenCV uses matrices to store
images and in OpenCV parlance, each pixel is represented by one matrix element and the
matrix “type” governs how OpenCV interprets each matrix element or pixel. CV 8C1 cor-
responds to one unsigned 8-bit value per element and CV F32C1 corresponds to one signed
32-bit floating value per element.
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A.2.2 Template Matching
Our system relies on OpenCV’s ability to find regions in an image that match a given
template. Templates are small images such as icons that may exist within a larger image.
The OpenCV function “matchTemplate” implements this feature with a variety of options
that define “match.” Our system relies on the following definition, which for each pixel
computes the sum of the square of the difference between the template and target image
aligned at a point.
R(x, y) =
∑
x ′,y′
(
T (x ′, y′)− I (x + x ′, y + y′))2
R is the resultant calculation at each pixel x and y, T is the template, I is the image, and
x ′ and y′ are valid pixel positions within the template. See the OpenCV documentation for
other “match” techniques [22].
The result of all calculations are written into a result matrix. The system normalizes the
matrix and then searches for all values below a user-defined threshold. We use the value
0.00006 in the five in one tool (Section 6.2) and a tool for counting matching templates
(Figure C.5). We use 0.00005 within the scrubs tool (Section 6.1). We determined these
values through qualitative analysis.
A.3 liblinear
liblinear implements a set of high-speed SVM classifiers. It provides commandline appli-
cations for training and classifying data, good documentation and guidance for using the
library to achieve reasonable classification performance, and a documented data format for
training and testing data sets. Figure A.3 provides a sample file and a description of the
file format, which includes feature vectors and their labels. Figure A.4 provides a sample
SVM parameter set generated by training a model using labeled data. liblinear uses the
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parameter set to make predictions on related, unlabeled data points.
-1 1:-0.00135181 2:-0.00134854 3:0.000421816 4:0.000444805
1 1:-0.00135181 2:-0.00132873 3:0.000289231 5:0.00034581
-1 3:0.000290677 4:0.000338868 5:0.000347394 7:-0.000188436
-1 4:0.000338977 5:0.000347591 6:0.000339016 7:-0.000189546
Figure A.3: liblinear data file. Data files consist of feature vectors and their labels in a text-
based, sparse-data format. Each row begins with a feature label chosen from {−1, 1}, and a
list of 1-indexed, index:feature pairs. Whitespace separates each line item and lines end with
a newline. Feature values of 0 are not written and therefore, the sparse data format more
efficiently represents sparse data. Our system realizes no gain using this approach because
our features are dense with 30 features per label.
1 s o l v e r t y p e L1R LR
2 n r c l a s s 2
3 l a b e l −1 1
4 n r f e a t u r e 30
5 b i a s −1
6 w
7 −21.52096798121508
8 −30.24049436071538
9 .
10 . [ v a l u e s e l i d e d ]
11 .
12 −558.8403947460139
13 −914.9739787865601
14 0
15 −164.7544799904056
16 .
17 . [ v a l u e s e l i d e d ]
18 .
Figure A.4: SVM parameter set. liblinear creates a classifier of this nature after training
on a labeled data set. This particular one is an L1-regularlized logistic regression classifier.
Thirty features are associated with this SVM and two classes of labels exist, drawn from values
{−1, 1}. liblinear’s commandline tools or API can be used to generate and use this file. Note
that any parameters values of “0” (line 14) represent input features that are not used by the
model and can be removed from the input data set.
We used their commandline applications as API guides to build a trainer and classifier
that interfaces the binary data formats of our system. While using the API, we found
two interesting points to remember while programmatically populating a liblinear feature
vector. First, feature vectors are 1-indexed, so any 0-valued indices are incorrect. Second,
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1 f o r ( u32 i = 0 ; i < n ; i ++) {
2 . . .
3 f o r ( u32 j = 0 ; j < f e a t u r e s −>c o l s ; j ++) {
4 prob . x [ i ] [ j ] . i n d e x = j +1; / / 1− i n d e x e d
5 prob . x [ i ] [ j ] . v a l u e = f e a t u r e s −>a t <f l o a t> ( row , j ) ;
6 }
7 prob . x [ i ] [ f e a t u r e s −>c o l s ] . i n d e x = −1; / / end marker
8 prob . x [ i ] [ f e a t u r e s −>c o l s ] . v a l u e = 0 ;
9 }
Figure A.5: Programmatically populating a liblinear feature vector. This code snippet demon-
strates the feature indices must be 1-indexed and the last feature index must be −1. Without
these, liblinear will behave erratically. In more detail, “prob” on lines 4-5 and 7-8 is a li-
blinear “struct problem” data structure, x is an array of feature vectors represented by a
two-dimensional array of liblinear “feature node” structures. x [i] is a single feature vector,
and x [i] [ j] is a single feature. Each feature has an index and corresponding value.
each feature vector represented by a liblinear “feature node” must end with an index value
of −1. liblinear uses a sparse data representation and represents the end of a feature vector
internally with a −1 marker. Listing A.5 demonstrates these points with a code snippet
from our implementation.
A.4 CGAL
The Computations Geometry Algorithms Library (CGAL) implements an fast box inter-
section algorithm [70] that we rely on in various tools and analysis applications. The li-
brary contains extensive documentation, samples, and references to academic works that it
implements. CGAL relies heavily on C++ templates and thus debugging can be difficult
when the compiler displays a page of template arguments associated with one line of code.
We found that working from the manual’s sample code [37] provided a workable solution
for our box intersection problem. CGAL routines interact naturally with STL containers,
which simplifies greatly their integration into our code.
We discovered two points worth sharing about CGAL and the box-intersection routine.
First, the routine does not support “shared ptr.” The manual describes storing their “Box”
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objects or “Box *” pointers directly within a container. Although we worked around this is-
sue, it would be natural to include support for C++ draft standard “shared ptr” [3]. Second,
upon call of “CGAL::box intersection d,” the copy constructor of the callback argument is
invoked. Thus, if the callback is used to track data while the intersection algorithm exe-
cutes, the callback object whose copy constructor was invoke will not experience changes
to internal data structures unless those structures are pointers or references to data from a
different scope. Figure A.6 demonstrates this issue with an example.
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1 c l a s s B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r {
2 p u b l i c :
3 B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r ( i n t &i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ) :
4 i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ( i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ) { }
5 B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r ( c o n s t B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r &h ) :
6 i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ( h . i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ) { }
7 / / i n v o k e d on i n t e r s e c t i o n by CGAL : : b o x i n t e r s e c t i o n d
8 void operator ( ) ( c o n s t Box ∗a , c o n s t Box ∗ query ) {
9 i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ++;
10 }
11 i n t c o u n t ( void ) c o n s t { re turn i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ; }
12
13 p r i v a t e :
14 i n t &i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ;
15 } ;
16
17 . . .
18
19 i n t i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r = 0 ;
20 Box query [ ] = { bbox } ;
21 Box ∗qp [ ] = { que ry } ;
22 B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r c a l l b a c k ( i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r ) ;
23
24 / / ‘ ‘ c a l l b a c k ’ ’ copy c t r invoked , b u t o b j e c t
25 / / m a i n t a i n s r e f e r e n c e t o i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r
26 CGAL : : b o x i n t e r s e c t i o n d ( b o x e s p t r s . b e g i n ( ) ,
27 b o x e s p t r s . end ( ) ,
28 qp ,
29 qp +1 ,
30 c a l l b a c k ) ;
31
32 / / Because B o x I n t e r s e c t i o n H a n d l e r m a i n t a i n s a r e f e r e n c e
33 / / t o i n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t e r , t h i s w i l l p r i n t a c o r r e c t v a l u e .
34 c o u t << ‘ ‘ I n t e r s e c t i o n c o u n t : ’ ’ << c a l l b a c k . c o u n t ( ) << e n d l ;
Figure A.6: Tracking state during execution of “CGAL::box intersection d.”
“Box Intersection Handler” maintains a reference “intersection counter ” on line 14
to “intersection counter” on line 19. Therefore, when the “CGAL::box intersection d”
is invoked on line 26 and “callback”s copy constructor (line 5) is invoked within
“CGAL::box intersection d,” updates to “intersection counter ” on line 9 in the new
copy will be visible in the original “callback” object. Consequently, the last print statement
on line 34 will function as expected.
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Appendix B
Datasets
Our dataset is comprised of three screenshot collections and two derived files for each
screenshot. Because healthcare was an important motivating application domain for this
work, we obtained two datasets of electronic health record (EHR) screenshots, each from a
different hospital. The third collection is a set of random desktop screenshots and screen-
shot snippets from a MacBook Pro laptop running OS X 10.6. Finally, for each EHR
screenshot we compute files used to aid redaction processing and analysis.
The EHR screenshots contain fake patient data but are still considered sensitive. Conse-
quently, we store them in a 256-bit AES encrypted disk volume. Additionally, we do not
display their unredacted form, limit their redacted display throughout this dissertation, and
reveal only aggregate analysis and comments. Finally, because we perform system analysis
on these sets, and the size of each dataset is tens of files, we use a file naming convention
conducive to scripting. Names exist in the form “n.png,” where n ∈ [1, |dataset|].
Some of the random desk screenshots also contain sensitive information. Therefore, we
do not display unredacted information where relevant.
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B.1 Processed Data
Along with each EHR dataset image, we generate and store Gabor features, feature meta-
data, and labels used for unsupervised and supervised pixel classification as described in
Chapter 5. Features and metadata reside within one binary file and labels within another.
Features, meta data, and labels are each represented by a OpenCV matrix data structure,
and matrices are stored on disk as described in Appendix A, Figure A.2.
Features:
-----------------------------------------------------------
| # pixels | 30 | 4*30 | CV_F32C1 | (# pixels*4*30) bytes |
-----------------------------------------------------------
ith row of features:
---------------------------------------------------------
| feat_0 | feat_1 | ... | feat_28 | row # | col # |
---------------------------------------------------------
Feature coordinates (begins immediately following Features):
-------------------------------------------------------
| # pixels | 2 | 4*2 | CV_u8C1 | (# pixels*4*2) bytes |
-------------------------------------------------------
ith row of coordinates:
-----------------
| row # | col # |
-----------------
Figure B.1: File layout of Gabor-features. A “features” file contains a matrix of Gabor fea-
tures (as described in Chapter 5) and matrix of feature coordinates. Each contains one row for
each image pixel. In the feature matrix, each row contains 30×4-byte floating-point elements
for each pixel, and rows do not exist in image-pixel order. Twenty-eight elements of each
feature are normalized, floating-point Gabor-feature values and two are normalized floating-
point pixel-coordinate values used during Gabor analysis. The feature-coordinates matrix
exists after the features matrix in the features file, and each row in the coordinates matrix
consists of 2×4-byte unsigned integer fields. The ith row of the coordinates matrix consists of
the row and column pixel value for the ith feature vector stored much earlier in the same file.
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Feature labels:
---------------------------------------------------------------
| k | i | # pixels | 1 | 4*1 | CV_u8C1 | (# pixels*4*1) bytes |
---------------------------------------------------------------
| label meta data |
--------- |
| matrix of label data |
-------------------------------------------------------
ith row of labels:
----------------------
| label \in [0, k-1] |
----------------------
Figure B.2: File layout of feature-labels. The “labels” file contains a kmeans label (as de-
scribed in Chapter 5) for each pixel. The jth row corresponds to the jth image pixel and
contains a 1-byte integer pixel label drawn from the range [0, k − 1]. The k value used to gen-
erate the label set is listed first in the file as an unsigned 4-byte integer, followed by a separate
unsigned 4-byte integer i that represents which label class corresponds to text.
B.2 Summary of Datasets
B.2.1 EHR set 1
This dataset contains 51 screenshots from an EHR system. Screenshots vary signifi-
cantly in visual content. Image attributes include the following: PNG format, RGB color,
1502 × 1901 pixels in size, and 150 pixels/inch. A few images have a slightly larger size
of 1502× 1093 pixels. Image files range in size from 1-1.5 MB, feature files each contain
approximately 201 MB, and label files each contain approximately 6.3 MB.
B.2.2 EHR set 2
This dataset contains 29 screenshots from a separate EHR system. Screenshots vary in
visual content but not as significantly as the first set. Additionally, screenshots contain a
small border artifact beyond the size of the captured application window. Image attributes
include the following: PNG format, RGB color, 1680 × 1050 pixels in size, and 72 pixel-
s/inch. Image files range in size from approximately 230-390 KB, feature files each contain
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approximately 216 MB, and label files each contain approximately 6.8 MB.
B.2.3 Random laptop screenshots
This dataset contains approximately 17 screenshots from a separate EHR system. Screen-
shots vary widely in visual content and size. Some screenshots are application windows
and others are snippets of larger screenshots. Image attributes include the following: PNG
and JPG formats, RGB color, 397 × 101 through 1440 × 900 pixels in size, and a mix of
72 and 150 pixels/inch. Image files range in size from approximately 58-595 KB, feature
files range in size from 54-112 MB, and corresponding label files range from 1.7-3.5 MB.
We did not generate a feature file for each non-EHR screenshot.
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Appendix C
Analysis Tools
In this appendix, we describe a number of small tools developed to support development
and analysis of this system. They are built with functionality developed over Chapters 3– 6
and support discussion in Chapter 7. Next we describe the functionality and commandline
usage of each tool.
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Usage:
count_rects <img>
<img> The image file to redact and count rectangles.
Figure C.1: Count the number of rectangles in the image. Canny-redact the image, count, and
return the number of subsequent contours present in the image.
Usage:
measure_redaction_effect <img dir> <low img id>
<high img id (inclusive)> <low frac>
<high frac> <step>
<img dir> The director holding the images to compare.
<low img id> The lowest numbered image filename.
(Integer file names are assumed.)
<high img id> The highest numbered image filename,
inclusive.
<low frac> The starting fraction of image pixels to
redact uniform-at-random (UAR).
<high frac> The ending fraction of image pixels to
redact UAR.
<step> The step for each loop iteration to get
get form <low frac> to <high frac>
Figure C.2: Measure redaction effect over directory of images. For each image pair within
a directory, compute the fraction of pairwise, text-redaction pixels that overlap. A pixel pair
consists of one pixel from the same location in each image of a pair. Pairs that include two
black pixels before redaction and due to image size mismatches, pixels without a pair never
change value after redaction. When both pixels in a pair correspond to text, text redaction
converts non-black pixel values to black (the redaction color).
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Usage:
compare_similarity_of_all <img dir> <low img id>
<high img id (inclusive)> <low frac>
<high frac> <step>
<img dir> The director holding the images to compare.
<low img id> The lowest numbered image filename.
(Integer file names are assumed.)
<high img id> The highest numbered image filename,
inclusive.
<low frac> The starting fraction of image pixels to
redact uniform-at-random (UAR).
<high frac> The ending fraction of image pixels to
redact UAR.
<step> The step for each loop iteration to get
get form <low frac> to <high frac>
Figure C.3: Pixel-by-pixel comparison between redacted images in a directory. Iterating
over all image pairs in a directory (except those of identical images), the application first
supervised-Gabor redacts images, chooses <low frac> pixels uniform-at-random (UAR) to
color black, colors those pixels in each image, and counts how many pixel values at a identi-
cal image positions match one another. The Gabor-feature files and a liblinear-defined SVM
models are used to redact images, and the <low frac>, <high frac> <step> values define
the loop used to incrementally increase the number of pixels redacted UAR. The fraction does
not account for already redacted pixels and therefore may overlap with them. We only an-
alyzed output associated with supervised-Gabor redaction and left unused the computations
associated with additional UAR redaction.
Usage:
compare_prediction_performance <features> <labels> <model>
<feature> Gabor image features.
<labels> Ground-truth labels that define which
Gabor-image features are redacted pixels and
which are not.
<model> A liblinear trained classifier to use to
redact images before comparing.
Figure C.4: Compute redaction performance of a trained SVM classifier. Using the trained
SVM <model>, classify each feature as text (1) or not text (−1). Compare against the given
feature labels to compute the true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative
rates of the classifier.
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Usage:
count_matching_templates <img> <templates> [thresh]
<img> The image to search for templates.
<templates> I file of templates to search for
and count within <img>
[thresh] The threshold below which a positive
match is identified.
Figure C.5: Count the number of template matches within a given image. Templates can
be defined and stored using the five in one tool described in Section 6.2. Subsection A.2.2
describes the matching function. The default matching threshold is 0.00006, which was qual-
itatively derived to provide a visual balance between false positive and false negative matches
within our datasets.
Usage:
compute_matching_perf <img>
<img> The image to search for templates.
Figure C.6: Analyze computational performance of template matching. Generate templates of
size M × M where M = 2i , i ∈ [1, 2min(log2(w),log2(h))], w = image width, and h = image height;
match each against the image; and evaluate match results.
Usage:
count_subset_frac <dir> <first> <last>
<dir> Directory of images to examine
<first> The name of the first file. File names are
assumed to be "[integer].png", where
[integer] is a number >= 0.
<last> The name of the last file numerically. The
value is inclusive.
Figure C.7: Compute a histogram of redaction rectangle size ratios of all images within a di-
rectory. For each image, apply Canny-based redaction to the image as described in Section 5.2,
iterate over all redaction rectangles, and for each, compute the fraction of total rectangle count
that resides wholly within its bounds.
Usage:
count_subsets <img>
<img> The image to count redaction rectangles.
Figure C.8: Compute a histogram of redaction rectangle size ratios of a single image within a
directory. Do the same operation as described in Figure C.7, but only with a single image.
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Usage:
canny_redact <img>
<img> The image to redact using a Canny-based technique.
Figure C.9: Generate Canny-based redaction rectangles. Used to analyze computational per-
formance of the Canny redaction technique.
Usage:
generate_gabor_features <img> <features>
<img> The image over which to generate gabor
features.
<features> The feature file to store generated gabor
features.
Figure C.10: Generate Gabor features for redaction. Features are written to the output file
named <features> and Subsection 5.3.2 describes the method used to generate the features.
Usage:
get_color_variety <img dir> <low img id> <high img id (inclusive)>
<img dir> The director holding the images to analyze.
<low img id> The lowest numbered image filename.
(Integer file names are assumed.)
<high img id> The highest numbered image filename,
inclusive.
Figure C.11: Generate an RGB color histogram over all unredacted images in a directory.
Usage:
get_color_histos <img>
<img> The image over which to compute RGB color
histograms. Image text is first redacted.
Figure C.12: Generate RGB color histograms of each unredacted image.
Usage:
get_layout_histos <img> <features> <labels>
<img> The image over which to compute layou
histograms. Image text is first redacted.
<features> The feature file associated <img>.
<labels> The feature labels of <img>.
Figure C.13: Generate layout histograms of the text-redacted image. Text-redact the image
and compute histograms of the x and y coordinates of the upper left corner of each redaction
rectangle and each rectangle’s width and height.
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Usage:
ground_truth2liblinear <features> <labels> <seed>
<train frac> <ofile (append)>
<features> An image feature file.
<labels> Feature labels for the same image.
<seed> The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
seed.
<train frac> The fraction of features to output as
training features.
(0 < <train frac> <=1.0)
<ofile (append)> The file to write the liblinear-formatted
features.
Figure C.14: Convert features from our binary format to liblinear format. The number of
features sub-selected from the feature list are appended to the file <ofile>. The application
selects features uniform-at-random using a PRNG with seed <seed>. Section B.1 describes
our file formats for features and labels, which is binary. Section A.3 describes the liblinear file
format, which is text-based.
Usage:
ground_truth2support_vectors <features> <labels>
<train frac> <nfold> <C> <seed> <ofile>
<features> An image feature file.
<labels> Feature labels for the same image.
<train frac> The fraction of features to use while
training the SVM.
(0 < <train frac> <=1.0)
<nfold> The n-fold cross validation to use during
training.
<C> The C constant to use for the SVM.
<seed> The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
seed.
<ofile> The file to write the trained liblinear
SVM.
Figure C.15: Train a liblinear L1-regularized L2-loss SVM. Use a fraction of the features
and their corresponding labels, <nfold> cross-validation, and the SVM constant C=<C>
to generate a SVM. During training, choose the training features UAR, and seed the PRNG
function using <seed>. Feature and label files should exist in the binary format described in
Section B.1.
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Usage:
label_ground_truth <img> <features> <labels>
<img> An image from which to label ground truth.
<features> Image features.
<labels> File to hold feature labels.
Figure C.16: Generate ground-truth text-redaction labels for an image. Using Gabor redac-
tion and unsupervised classification of a single image, cycle through i ∈ [0, 1] for k = 2 and
i ∈ [0, 2] for k = 3 and allow the user to save pixel labels corresponding to the set that provides
the best text-redaction visually.
Usage:
load_features_and_segment <img> <features> [k]
<img> An image from which to label ground truth.
<features> Image features.
<k> The number of unsupervised classes.
Figure C.17: Display all text-redacted images using kmeans clustering. An image will be
displayed with each class of i ∈ [0, k − 1] chosen as the redacted pixels.
Usage:
load_features_and_labels <features> <labels>
<features> Image features.
<labels> Feature labels.
Figure C.18: Load features and labels for an image. Used to analyze computational perfor-
mance of loading features from a file versus generating them.
Usage:
load_features_and_segment_labeled <img> <features> <labels>
<img> The image to redact.
<features> Image features.
<labels> Feature labels.
Figure C.19: Compute unsupervised Gabor redaction using features and labels. Used to ana-
lyze computational performance of unsupervised Gabor-redaction technique.
Usage:
redact_using_model <img> <features> <model>
<img> An image from which to label ground truth.
<features> Image features.
<model> A liblinear trained classifier used to
text-redact the image.
Figure C.20: Text-redact an image using a SVM classifier. The redacted image is displayed on
the screen.
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Usage:
templates2img <templates> <oimg>
<templates> A file of template images.
<oimg> The image file to store the image collage
of templates.
Figure C.21: Create, display, and store a collage of image templates. Convert a binary file of
image templates to a PNG-formatted image with visually magnified template images and store
them in an output file.
Usage:
visualize_ground_truth <img> <features> <labels>
<img> An image file.
<features> Gabor features corresponding to the image file.
<labels> Feature labels that describe which pixels to redact.
Figure C.22: Visualize a single, redacted image using a set of features and labels. Used to
visualize ground truth produced using label ground truth.
Usage:
analyze_ws <dir> <first> <last>
<dir> Directory of images to examine whitespace
<first> The name of the first file. File names are
assumed to be "[integer].png", where
[integer] is a number >= 0.
<last> The name of the last file numerically. The
value is inclusive.
Figure C.23: Compute a histogram of inter-rectangle whitespace. For each image, apply
Canny-based redaction to the image as described in Section 5.2, iterate over all redaction
rectangles, and for each, evaluate the x-pixel distance between it and all other rectangles.
Limit the evaluation to pairs that satisfy the predicate defined in Figure 7.4.
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Appendix D
Contact Information
Please use the following information to contact the author or advisor with questions or
comments about the work and inquiries about source code.
name email role
Joe Cooley jcool@alum.dartmouth.org author
Dr. Sean Smith sws@cs.dartmouth.edu advisor
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